TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- TRIWEEKLY REPORT 21 AUGUST-10 SEPTEMBER 1993

TRIWEEKLY REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

JOINT COMMISSION SUPPORT BRANCH (JCSB)

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA) (TFR)

Period of Report: 21 August 1993 -- 10 September 1993

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DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION OFFICE 2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20301-2400

23 SEP 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR TOON AND COMMISSION MEMBERS

SUBJECT: TRIWEEKLY REPORT, 21 AUGUST- 10 SEPTEMBER 1993

Highlights of this reporting period focus on the commission's sixth plenary session as well as our visits to Armenia and the Russian Naval Archives in Gatchina. Minutes of the working group sessions dealing with Cold War shootdowns and the Korean War comprise the bulk of the report. The minutes of the Vietnam working group will be issued as an addendum to :the next triweekly.

The current report also contains information from a former MVD officer, Col Vladimir Malinin, claiming to have seen an American prisoner twice in the Soviet GULAG during the 1960s . A follow-up interview with Malinin has been scheduled with the participation of Russian commission staffers. Interview results will be presented to commissioners as part of our cable distribution, with further commentary in the next issue of our report.

We are making every effort to assure continuous and systematic follow-up on all issues identified by the working groups and endorsed by both commission co-chairmen. All commissioners and staff are invited to review the attached report and the appendices to it and advise this office of any requirements or suggestions they may have to advance the momentum achieved at our last set of meetings.

/signed/

Norman D. Kass Executive Secretary U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs

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TRIWEEKLY REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

JOINT COMMISSION SUPPORT BRANCH (JCSB) TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA) (TFR)

Period of Report: 21 August--10 September 1993

NOTE: This special edition of the Triweekly Report covers the 31 August--2 September 1993 plenary and working group sessions of the Joint Commission in Moscow. Transcripts and detailed summaries of the meetings are appended as Annexes A through D; therefore, the basic report covers only the highlights of the meetings and other events from the reporting period.

1. SUMMARY.

A. While General Volkogonov concurred that the work of the Joint Commission will have to continue well into 1994 and agreed to schedule the next plenary session for late-November/early-December 1993, perhaps the most salient aspect of this series of plenary and working group sessions was the controlling influence of the Russian security services and, especially, the representatives of the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS--formerly KGB). Despite protestations to the contrary, the Russian security service archives remain essentially closed; the FIS sponsors Russian side denials of any possibility of POW transport to the Soviet Union; the FIS representatives now feel free to interrupt and contradict Russian or U.S. Commission members, and to dictate the ultimate position of the Russian side. Conversely, no **member of the Russian** side is prepared to disagree with the FIS representatives. The climax of FIS involvement in this series of meetings came when Colonel Mazurov of the FIS twice inserted himself into the Toon-Volkogonov press conference, answering questions directed to Ambassador Toon. Transcripts of the opening and closing **plenary** sessions are attached as Annexes A and D.

B. VIETNAM. The Vietnam working group involved substantial give and take in a cooperative atmosphere. The Russian side provided additional documentation from intelligence archives indicating that the Vietnamese may have held more POWs than Hanoi admitted. One document, whose contents remain to be verified, gave a total number of U.S. aviator-POWs as 735. Other evidence and testimony, however, made it clear to the U.S. side that the Moscow-Hanoi relationship was not always smooth, and that the Vietnamese would have been reluctant to allow the Soviets a free hand with U.S. POWs. A detailed, near-verbatim report of the Vietnam working group's sessions will be published as Annex A of the next Triweekly Report.

C. COLD WAR. The Cold War working group examined all ten Cold War cases in detail, but the most meaningful evidence arose during the pre-plenary visit to Armenia, in which eyewitnesses convincingly described the catastrophic crash of the U.S. C-130 on 2 September 1958 in a manner that argues against survivors. Also, the post-plenary visit to the Naval Archives in Gatchina provided immediate documentary evidence to contradict the position of the security services that they had no patrol boats in

the vicinity of the over-water downing of the U.S. RB-50 shot down on 29 July 1953. An archival map showed that Border Guard patrol craft were deployed in force in the vicinity of the downing. A detailed report of the activities of the Cold War working group is attached as Annex C. A summary of the documents provided by the Russian side is attached as Annex G.

D. KOREA. The Korean War working group witnessed serious disagreements between the U.S. and Russian sides. The Russians do not accept the conclusion that U.S. POWs were transported from Korea to the former Soviet Union, and base this argument on what they perceive to be a lack of substantive evidence. While the atmosphere remained cordial, the U.S. side presented further documentary evidence, which it considers abundant and compelling, to the effect that U.S. POWs may have been transported from Korea to the former Soviet Union. The U.S. side requested specific Russian military archives by fond, file number, and name. The Russian side agreed to review its files for pertinent holdings. The most notable progress lay in the Russian admission that one or more F-86 fighter aircraft were transported to the Moscow area during the Korean War, and that there had been more contact between Soviet officers and U.S. POWs in Korea and China than had previously been acknowledged. On the issue of the transport of Korean War U.S. POWs to the USSR, the Russians continue to deny that any transfers took place. The U.S. side, however, remains convinced that the answers are contained in the archives and memories of the FIS and other security services; however, those files and personnel remain off-limits to U.S. Commission representatives. In this context, we await the results of General Volkogonov's offer to search the records from the special camps where the U.S. POWs are believed to have been held during that period. A transcript of the Korean War working group sessions is attached as Annex B.

E. A number of interviews and re-interviews were conducted during the reporting period; however, the most significant meeting was with retired MVD Colonel Vladimir Markarovich Malinin, who claims to have encountered American prisoners in the Soviet prison system on three occasions. Working with a book of MIA photographs, he identified SGT. Phillip Mandra, USMC, a Korean-War MIA, as the prisoner he had seen on two of the three occasions.

F. TFR also re-contacted Valentin Il'yich Dmitriyev, who previously testified that he saw Americans under guard in Vietnam in 1987. Dmitriyev said that, since his interview with TFR, he has had continual problems with authorities at work and in general.

G. JCSB analysts also deployed to the Russian air base at Templin, Germany, in response to a Congressional inquiry concerning the fate of an alleged USAF RF-4 which was rammed by a Soviet interceptor over in the vicinity of the Caucasus in 1973. The museum of the 20th Guards Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment, located on the Templin base, and local interviews with officers who recalled the unit's tour of duty in the Khabardino-Balkar region of southern Russia, made it clear that the incident involved a Turkish F-4 border violator. The Soviet pilot involved died in the crash (as did the Turkish pilot) and was posthumously awarded the title "Hero of the Soviet Union." An American source later confirmed that this incident had been written up in the Soviet press at the time it occurred. A more detailed report on this subject is included as Annex F. JCSB considers this case closed.

2. UPDATE ON ISSUES FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS:

A. TFR requested that the Russian side contact now-LTC Amirov to arrange a joint interview. The Russian side did not provide Amirov's telephone number to TFR. The Russian representative stated that Amirov believes the issue of American POW/MIAs is "closed," and he does not want to meet with anyone on the subject. Amirov referred all inquiries to parliamentarian Yuriy A. Smirnov.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 131412Z SEP 93]

B. TFR interviewed Vadim Bakatin, former head of the KGB. Bakatin denied ever having said that 25-30 Americans were transported from Vietnam during or after the war. Bakatin stated that he has never concerned himself with this subject and knows nothing about it. He suggested that TFR talk to General Volkogonov.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 131412Z SEP 93]

C. A team from the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) deployed to Armenia shortly before the visit of the Joint Commission to excavate the crash site of the U.S. C-130 shot down in the foothills of Mount Aragatz, west of Yerevan. Armenian authorities have been fully cooperative, and local residents have also done their best to aid the effort. An initial assessment of the crash site suggests that further remains fragments and other crash-related items may still be on the site. The U.S. delegation to the Joint Commission visited the site for a wreath-laying ceremony at a "Khachkar" memorial stone sculpted and placed on the site by local residents. The U.S. delegation also met with Armenian defense and security officials, who, although demonstrably cooperative, maintained that the records sought by the U.S. side had been moved to Moscow.

3. EVENTS, INTERVIEWS, CONTACTS, AND MEETINGS ATTENDED:

A. TFR deployed a team to Kirishi, St. Petersburg Oblast, to interview retired MVD Colonel Vladimir Makarovich Malinin, who had responded to the TFR advertisement in the newspaper, "Rossiya." Malinin was born on 24 June 1919 and is presently very ill with heart problems.

Colonel Malinin served as Chief of the Inspector General's Division of the Main Directorate: of Internal Affairs for the Leningrad District. He was also a former attendee of the KGB academy, which, coupled with his job position, allowed him "unrestricted" access to security service facilities.

Malinin stated that, in 1953 or 1954, he investigated complaints from a group of foreign prisoners held at the "Kresty" KGB prison at Arsenal Quay in Leningrad. While he was there, three prisoners waved from a separate room and shouted, "American, American, American." Malinin said that, although he does not speak English, he spoke German well and recognized French. He was "quite certain" that the language the prisoners used was English.

An even more interesting encounter occurred in Magadan. In the early 1960s, Malinin's first wife was transferred to a job in the GULag archives in Magadan, which were co-located with the KGB prison. Malinin followed her there and served as Chief of Staff of Civil Defense for the Magadan Region. On one occasion, Malinin visited the prison commander in his second floor office. The office overlooked the prison exercise yard, and Malinin noticed a lone individual walking in a large circle. The sight of a prison by himself struck Malinin as odd and he as the commander about it. The commander replied that the man was a "U.S. spy" who had just been transferred from a camp in the GULag. Malinin observed the prisoner for several minutes and got a good look at his face. Approximately three years later, Malinin re-visited the same office and saw the same prisoner in the courtyard.

TFR asked Malinin to look through a book of photographs of U.S. Korean-War era MIAs. While Malinin thought that the photo of 1LT Donald E. Bell resembled one of the inmates from "Kresty" prison, he stated that he could not be positive, since he did not see those prisoners for very long and a great deal of time had elapsed. He stopped, however, when he came to the photo of SGT Phillip Mandra, USMC, who had gone missing during a counterattack in Korea. Malinin said that the photo bore a strong resemblance to the solitary prisoner in Magadan.

Malinin then came to a computer-aged image of Mandra. At that point, he stopped and stated firmly that he is very sure that Mandra was the Magadan prisoner. Malinin gave no indication that he recognized anyone else from the identification book.

Malinin also said that, while he was in Magadan, a KGB officer mentioned to him that four Americans were in a camp hospital four kilometers south of Susuman. He also claimed that he had been told, and his wife had confirmed, that there was a nuclear power generating plant far north of Magadan and that a number of uranium mines were located within 80 kilometers of the plant. Foreign prisoners were used exclusively in this work area, according to Malinin. He further stated that he had been told that the prisoners who were sent there were not expected to return.

At the request of TFR, Malinin repeated the key portions of his testimony on videotape. He also furnished TFR with a copy of a manuscript, part of which deals with the issue of U.S. prisoners in the GULag. A follow-up interview with Colonel Malinin is being conducted in Moscow by U.S. and Russian staff members. The results of this interview will be published in the next triweekly report.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 131412Z SEP 93]

B. JCSB representatives deployed to Moscow to take part in a "reunion" between retired U.S. and Soviet/Russian fighter pilots, during which they interviewed Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel (Ret.) Evgenii Georgievich Pepelyaev, who commanded a Soviet fighter regiment flying against U.S. aircraft during the Korean War. Pepelyaev offered a range of insights into how the Soviet system worked (or failed to work) in Korea, and was an eyewitness at a number of F-86 shootdowns (he was personally credited with 11-12 F-86 "kills"). The details of this encounter are contained in Annex E.

C. Following the Moscow Plenary and Working Group Sessions, the U.S. Delegation, accompanied by General Volkogonov, stopped in St. Petersburg and visited the Naval Archives at Gatchina. Captain First Rank Reznikov, a former submarine group commander and current Director of the archives, received the delegation. His attitude was impressively straightforward and helpful. Although many sought-after documents are still undergoing declassification, Reznikov allowed the delegation to review key items. This proved especially valuable, since General Volkogonov was able to see the difference between the actual source material and the sanitized and edited information that reaches his office through the General Staff. Volkogonov saw first-hand a map that placed KGB/Border Guards patrol craft at the site of the shootdown of the U.S. RB-50 off Vladivostok on 29 July 1953. Due to time constraints, the U.S. Delegation was not able to review all of the documents flagged by the staff of the archive, but General Volkogonov stated that TFR/JCSB researchers would be authorized to visit Gatchina and work directly with the pertinent documentation. JCSB intends to reinforce TFR for this mission. Volkogonov also agreed to a near-term joint visit to Podol'sk to reinvigorate the research effort in the Army Archives.

D. The course of the Plenary Sessions and Working Group meetings in Moscow are covered in complete detail in the annexes to this document, and the actual words and interactions of the participants are far more eloquent than any summary can be. A few points deserve to be highlighted, however.

(1) On Vietnam, it is impossible at this time to judge with confidence whether any U.S. prisoners were transported from Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union. If such events did occur, we have obtained no information indicating even an approximate number of POWs involved. From the documents provided and the followup work of the Commission staff, we expect to be able to examine the question with greater precision and intensity. It has become increasingly clear that the Soviets found dealing with the North Vietnamese extremely frustrating and that, unlike the situation in Korea in the early 1950s, the Soviets were not in a position to dictate terms to the Vietnamese--who realized fully the value of U.S. POWs.

(2) On Korea, despite the U.S. presentation of a video on eyewitness accounts in April, and continuing high U.S. interest in the issue of POW transfers from Korea to the former Soviet Union, the Russian side opened the first plenary session by suggesting that the Korean issue had been resolved. When the U.S. side insisted on pursuing it and providing further detailed evidence of Soviet involvement with U.S. POWs from Korea, the Russian side consistently stated that the evidence was not credible. Only the detailed research and analysis by the U.S. side, and the determination of the U.S. chairman and co-chairman for Korea kept the issue alive--and even allowed substantial progress. As stated above, the security services are least cooperative on this issue.

(3) On the Cold War, an initial review of the documents passed to the U.S. side reinforced the JCSB contention that the shootdown of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft was anything but a routine event and elicited immediate message traffic from the field to the highest levels of the Soviet government. The documentation also makes it clear that the Soviet military and the security services routinely conducted intensive searches for the downed aircraft and their crews.

4 RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. The U.S. side should actively pursue interim contacts with the Russian co-chairmen of the working groups in order to expedite the work of the Joint Commission. Further, the U.S. side should strictly adhere to the format of opening plenary session--working group sessions--closing plenary session that proved so much more productive and flexible than previous formats.

B. JCSB and TFR should deploy researchers to Gatchina as soon as possible, and should pursue the joint visit to Podol'sk promised by General Volkogonov.

C. TFR should continue to pursue the issue of design bureau archives and interviews with design bureau personnel.

D. The U.S. side should continue to plainly state its conviction that the answers to all of the key outstanding questions on the issue of POW/MIA transfers to the former Soviet Union lie in the archives of the Russian security services and the memories of security services veterans.

E. JCSB must continue to build the case on Korean War transfers, with a supplementary document to be delivered to the Russian side at the next plenary session.

F. Although many questions regarding WWII POWs have been answered, the U.S. side should remain open to new evidence that may arise in the course of JCSB/TFR's research and should reserve the right to re-open the issue in the future.

G. The U.S. side should continue to communicate to the Russian side its belief that Russian archives must hold supplementary documentation on Vietnam-era POW/MIAs, and documentation complementary to those documents ("1205" and "735") already received.

H. The U.S. side should review all documents received from the Russian side, analyze the contents, and develop a working agenda for the next plenary session in Moscow (tentatively scheduled for late November/early December 1993).

I. The U.S. side, through the Executive Secretariat and in close consultation with Ambassador Toon and Commission members, will initiate a comprehensive review of all available holdings in an effort to respond to the list of Soviet unaccounted-for personnel passed to Ambassador Toon at the plenary session.

ANNEX A TO JCSB TRIWEEKLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 21 AUGUST -- 10 SEPTEMBER 1993.

SUBJECT: Transcript of Plenary Session of the Joint U.S. Russian Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, Tuesday, 31 August 1993.

Note: The session convened at 10:00 A.M. Moscow Time, in Kremlin Building # 14, "The Hall Of Government Meetings.

The session was opened by the Chairman of the Russian Side, Colonel General Dmitrii A. Volkogonov, who offered remarks of welcome. Ambassador Malcolm Toon, Chairman of the U.S. Side responded, after which the session's work began.

Volkogonov: "Although the U.S. side wants separate working groups, we believe successive sessions would be preferable, since our experts, such as our archivists, must attend all of them. Can we agree to this?"

Toon: "Since we have a good personal relationship, I'll tell you the truth. In the old days, I wasn't sure if I'd be entrapped, Our relationship was far from warm--even lied to or even clubbed. hostile, at times. It is a source of great satisfaction to me and to our delegation that all this has changed and we can feel comfortable in these surroundings. These excellent relations allow me to raise two points. The schedule

you proposed--I assumed we'd hold a plenary session this morning and that this afternoon and tomorrow morning and afternoon would be dedicated to the working groups. Whether these are simultaneous or subsequent depends on your personnel, but the working groups should have ample time allotted to them, since you and I are only figureheads. I hope we can agree to working groups."

Volkogonov: "If the U.S. side requires it, we can do it. The Korea group will meet here in the *Malyi Zal* (Little Hall) working group on Vietnam in the Main Archives Building, and the Cold War group in my office on Staraya *Ploshchad'* (Old Square). Today, we'll listen to both reports and discuss questions that might arise. After lunch, we'll work in sections, by working groups. The buffet will be open downstairs. Ambassador Toon has asked to meet with some important people from the GRU and FIS [Foreign Intelligence Service]--they are here. This afternoon at 1600, 4-5 people from the U.S. side and 4-5 people from the Russian side will meet with Mr. Filatov, the Chief of the Presidential Administration, in the next building. Are there any questions from the Russian side? If not, let's get down to work." "I'll give the report from the Russian side of the Joint Commission. We welcome our U.S. colleagues with pleasure. A few years ago, the communication problems between us would not have allowed such a discussion. The work of our commission is impressive--its an outstanding example of cooperation and demonstrates adherence to civilized norms for Russia, a new respect for humanitarian values, for human life. Of course, there are some forces that would like to turn back the clock. This is the sixth time we've met, and this itself is significant. We know each other well--we've moved forward on the issue of U.S. service members on the soil of the former Soviet Union after the Second World War. Of course, we will try to answer *all* relevant questions, our work is not yet complete, but the preliminary results indicate that our efforts have been successful."

"I believe it's important to concentrate on unresolved issues and on new information that has come to light since our last session--documents, oral evidence. Following our last session, Russian experts in the archives met with people who could shed light on events and queried various agencies concerning the fates of Americans. But we should stick to the order: Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War. The questions will be answered in special reports by experts from the Russian side, Colonel Mukhin, Mr. Kozlov, and LTC Osipov. We won't be discussing the Second World War, since that's largely a closed matter now and the work is mostly complete. Still, new documents emerge about the presence of American citizens on Soviet soil. Practically all of these Americans fall into three known categories: Prisoners of War, all of whom were repatriated, excepting those who died; American citizens who were liberated from the Nazis and repatriated between 1944 and 1946; and those who found themselves on the territory of the Soviet Union due to the post-war changes of boundaries and were 'Sovietized.' The new documents just duplicate other information. 22,550 American POWs were repatriated."

"In the course of the expedition to Sakhalin and the Kurils, we could not discover firm evidence, but it's a fact that the camps existed. In '45, '42 and '43, Japanese camps were established for American citizens. Old folks out there say there were between five and twelve thousand people in the camps. Before we continue to pursue this matter we need the concurrence of the U.S. side to go ahead. we must do it well . l'

"On Korea: last time we heard a special report from the U.S. side. We handed over interrogation reports on 48 U.S. POWs. We gave you information on 137 shootdowns in Korea by Soviet air defense forces. Since then, the Russian side did additional work in the archives of the MoD, the Secretariat, the Politburo and the Central Committee. We discovered new documents in the MoD archives--Colonel Mukhin will give a special report and hand over the relevant documents. I'll just present general information. In the skies above Korea, we've established that 1,057 American aircraft were shot down by fighter aviation and 137 by ground air defense. All of the information of the shootdowns by aviation will be given to you today. We'll discuss the fates of individual American citizens."

"The U.S. side asked for additional information on interrogations--we've found information on 15 more American POWs--we'll give this to the U.S. side. A great many people took care to review a great many documents, looking at every page, and they found not one document indicating the presence of U.S. citizens on Soviet territory at that time. There are no personnel who could serve as eyewitnesses. If the U.S. side has more evidence, we are ready to listen and to organize further expeditions, but, most likely, this issue is exhausted. It is a mystery that may be solved later. We've analyzed the materials and can state

that, in Russia today, there are no U.S. citizens--no Korean War POWs--held against their will on former Soviet soil. The ministries for security matters conducted additional checks, and no U.S. citizens are being held against their will."

"On Vietnam--well, this is always the most complicated issue, due to the fact that the war was on the territory of a third party. It's also complicated by the fact that no large Soviet units were engaged. There were mostly just advisers. Therefore, the military archives hold practically nothing. Everything that we found was in the Central Committee Archives. And I have to remind you of our unusual relationship with our Vietnamese allies. There was not much trust, even in the best years. Professor Kozlov will make a special report on these issues."

"Last time, we handed over a document indicating that the Vietnamese held 1,205 American prisoners. This document was a sensation in the U.S. Now I'd like to make a comment: the Russian side believes this document is genuine, but we cannot confirm whether its contents are accurate or false. The numbers might include all foreigners perhaps, which I think might be closer to Hanoi's current position. In any event, I do think it's only possible to obtain a final answer from the Hanoi regime. Certainly, we would like to know the results of the trip by Senator Smith and others. We could not find any evidence of U.S. POWs on Soviet territory except those we mentioned before--defectors who were used for propaganda and who were then sent west by way of Moscow. We've heard of suspicions of Americans held here, but we have not found a single document or eyewitness to confirm such a thing. At the present level of openness in our society, I cannot imagine hiding such a fact. Today, it would just not be possible to keep it hidden."

"We also have four documents for you related to the proposed project to repatriate U.S. POWs through Moscow. It's not even necessary for us to discuss this issue, since these documents dot all the i's.

"As far as the Cold War goes, we're concerned primarily with shootdowns. The formal report will be made by my colleague LTC Osipov. I'd like to remind you that, at the last session, we came to an agreement on 8 of the 10 cases and agreed to concentrate on the remaining 2: the Sea of Japan incident with the RB-50 on 29 July 1953, and the 2 September 1958 shootdown over Armenia. We've done a very thorough investigation of these two incidents and we'll hand over new documents."

"First, the 1953 Sea of Japan case. We've also made inquiries to the Ministry of Fisheries, to the Presidential Archives and Central Committee Archives--but the results concern only what was already known. We found no knew evidence on this issue. Additionally, we queried the Gatchina Naval Archive. The U.S. side will visit Gatchina and see the documentation for itself.

"You know about the C-130 Armenia shootdown. There are lots of documents, and, yes, the Soviets rejected that it had been shot down, although the leadership knew. There were six confirmed sets of remains, but we don't know how many others there may have been. Tomorrow, retired Colonel-General Sosinov will give a report. He's 78 years old. In 1958, he was the PVO commander for the region where the aircraft was shot down. He'll give details about the situation in the region at the time. It's important, because he actually saw how the aircraft went down, how the second attack hit the tail and the aircraft went spinning vertically down. No one got out and the fuel, which was full, exploded and burned for eight hours. It was extremely difficult to approach the aircraft and they could only find remains resembling six corpses. Only some tail components which split off remained identifiable. Sosinov was in Korea, too, and he can talk about it. In Armenia, the parachutist reports were probably the result of confusion. Two months earlier, on 27 June 1958, a Douglas C-118 was forced down near Agdam. Five people bailed out and all of them were handed over to the U.S. People remembering those events today get it wrong. It's psychologically understandable. They can't recall the right date. There's always an element of confusion in reminiscences. But, by hearing General Sosinov, you'll conclude that the crew died."

"We would definitely say that we don't have any big questions on the Second World War or Korea. There are some outstanding questions on Vietnam and the Cold War. I think we could consider some aspects of those problems. We've reviewed the documentation on Korea, Vietnam and the Cold War. Now, on the matter of U.S. prisoners being sent from Hanoi to the west by civil aviation, let me remind you that our

archives are not computerized and we have to go through them sheet by sheet. Well, I think we have to consider the international problems not directly related to the war. Maybe that way we could find more information. But let me move on to our requests to the U.S. side.

"What do you know about the fates of Soviet soldiers who became missing while serving abroad? Military aircraft and civilian aviation specialists who became missing without a trace while carrying out their military duty. We're not accusing anybody, but the times were as they were. The old Soviet leadership stuck to the Comintern doctrine of global confrontation and Soviet personnel were lost throughout the world, in Ethiopia, southern Africa, Yemen and in other places. Unlike the U.S. government, the Soviet government never cared about repatriating remains. But, in democratic Russia, we will try to right this wrong. Our request is this: if our U.S. colleagues know anything, please help us. We will present a list of missing persons today. Any information relating to these men will be appreciated."

"Also, we're concerned with aircraft that did not return to base, with aircrews that didn't come back. We'd be thankful if you could shed any light. Here's the list. Then there's also the issue of submarines..."

"In conclusion, I'd like to say to the members of the Commission and to the U.S. people--this humanitarian work improves and promotes relations between Russia and the U.S. We are ready to continue operating with the U.S. side, to continue to work if you want to continue our work. Thank you--and I'm sorry for my lengthy report. Now, would you mind if my friend Ambassador Toon makes his report?"

Toon: "Thank you, General, for your report. My initial impression is that we still have many questions to resolve. But I'm pleased that you and President Yeltsin underline the importance of this Commission by meeting here in the Kremlin. As I've said, I've been here many times, but under other circumstances. I'm glad that, because of our changed relationship, we meet as friends and not as opponents. As I mentioned before, President Clinton is interested in this issue and is closely monitoring our progress. I met with him once since he took office and he agrees that the Joint Commission has become an important part of our relationship. I can see that, on the basis of what I see today, that you and President Yeltsin share this view. I met with the President's top advisors just before this trip and will meet with the President just afterward. I hope to report favorably on our progress."

"Now I and my American colleagues have two fundamental objectives for our meetings this week. First, to foster a frank exchange of information by working groups on Korea, the Cold War and Vietnam. I would hope that these groups will function not only over the next few days but for the future. Our Cold War group will be headed by Dennis Clift, Korea by Mr. Kauzlarich, and Vietnam by Congressman Peterson. I hope this working group format will foster a good climate."

"Second, we need to work together with you to formulate a plan for the Joint Commission's future work. This plan will be based upon the results of the working groups today and tomorrow. In our view, this plan should focus on narrow and specific questions and on where the answers might be found. With regard to the Cold War, I firmly believe we should be able to resolve the fates of those missing from all ten shootdowns."

"General, maybe I misunderstood your remarks, but I thought you said eight cases were already resolved and we were only to focus on the remaining two--if that is your view, we are in serious disagreement. Would you care to comment?"

Volkogonov: "In the eight cases, we said that we had no more information. All of the personnel died when they crashed into the sea and a further search doesn't help. There's nothing new to add. I think that in Vladivostok, where there were reports of parachutes, we still need to check--but we have found no information on this. The other cases all involved people who died at sea. If you have something more, let us know--but we have nothing further. We are willing to continue to investigate if you can provide more information."

Toon: "That will be discussed. Regarding Vladivostok, we passed you information on Soviet patrol boats

near the crash site. I think this type of special information moved us closer to finding our what happened to the crew members of that RB-50. I am convinced that the answers lie in the Border Guards' after-action reports and other reports filed by Soviet personnel. We believe many of these documents may be found in the Naval Archives in Gatchina and, therefore, we look forward to our visit there."

"I'd like to stress once again that it's critical to the success of the Commission that we receive access to all POW-related information in Gatchina as well as in the MoD Archives at Podol'sk. As you know, General, yesterday we visited Armenia and we hope that our visit will lead to the uncovering of more information on the shootdown there in 1958. I had long conversations with their foreign minister and minister of defense. They told me all of the relevant information is in the archives in Moscow, not in Armenia. They told me all of the records of the Border Guards and the KGB which would hold information on shootdowns had been transferred to Moscow. We also talked to villagers in the area where the shootdown took place--and you are right: memories grow foggy after 35 years and we received conflicting reports as to whether there could have been survivors. We have a team of investigators there now--they'll be there for 2-3 weeks--and we hope to find more answers. Meanwhile, since we've been told by the Armenians that all of the archives are held here in Moscow, I hope you will use your good auspices to help us."

"I'd like to ask my colleague Dennis Clift, who heads up our Cold War working group, to say anything he might want to add--you see, as a private citizen, I have more members on my side than you have on yours as a general."

Clift: "Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. We look forward to exploring all ten incidents further in our working group. At our April session, we presented detailed histories of five of ten incidents. Since that time, we have developed detailed histories of the other five cases and we provided them to the Russian side through Task Force Russia. We will use those as the basis for our discussions. Regarding your aircraft, we have continued our work with the Joint Staff in Washington, including specifically the case of the shootdown of the IL-12 during the Korean War. We have that report to give to you, and we will be prepared to discuss your other questions.

Toon: "With regard to the Korean War--our interest in the transfer of U.S. POWs during the Korean War remains very high. My understanding on the basis of what you said today is that you and your colleagues have not uncovered any information to indicate that U.S. POWs were transferred to the USSR during the Korean War. But information we have acquired through debriefings of U.S. citizens, through Chinese and Russian officers, and through camp inmates from the Baltic States and elsewhere, is too compelling to ignore."

"I am not saying that we have established exactly how and when such transfers took place, but I do believe the information strongly indicates that we .should keep looking, and I hope I have your cooperation on this matter. One source claims he was in Camp 307, in Yakutia, with U.S. Korean War prisoners captured in 1951. The American POWs were Ted Watson, an Infantry lieutenant, and Fred Rosbicki, a commando or paratroop sergeant. I hope, General, you will check all records of prison camps in Yakutia for information of these two Americans. Also, we've learned that the Soviet ambassador to North Korea provided periodic reports to the Central Committee. We hope you can provide us with access to any pertinent POW/MIA information in those files. Also, we'd like to examine the operational files of the 64th Aviation Group from the Korean War. In addition, we'd like to learn the ID numbers of the U.S. F-86 aircraft taken to the Sukhoi Design Bureau. But all of these questions will be discussed in the working group sessions."

"Meanwhile, I am interested in the statement you made about U.S. POWs from Korea. You said no POWs were alive on Russian soil---does this mean there weren't ever any U.S. POWs from the Korean War held on Soviet territory? Or do you mean to leave that open?"

Volkogonov: "I'll answer. Regarding the Armenian archives, we have a report by General Pobadian of the security services related to the events of 1958. It was sent to Moscow, but there's a copy in Yerevan, too. The Armenians have everything in Yerevan. We're handing over a number of documents relating to this issue.

"My colleague Colonel Mukhin will answer your questions later, and 15 documents will be turned over."

"As regards Yakutia, prior to 1953, 3.5 to 4.5 million people were held in the camps. I will contact General Kalinin today and, since you've even given me the exact number of the camp, I promise we'll check all information on this camp today."

"Regarding reports from the Ambassador to North Korea, I personally reviewed all of them. Colonel-General Shtykov was the ambassador--it was a unique case of a military ambassador. I read all of Shtykov's documents--there are several volumes--and I don't remember anything concerning U.S. POWs. But I'll check them again .

"Regarding the files on the 64th Aviation Corps, Colonel Mukhin will present everything we have."

"Concerning the Sukhoi Design Bureau, yes, true, this is confirmed. Do you have any information on this aircraft? Unfortunately, we have only rumors, nothing definite."

"And, most importantly, your question: We do state that no U.S. citizens from Korea or Vietnam are on Russian territory. But I cannot be absolutely certain that there were never any on Soviet soil. That's our purpose. I'm definitely interested in the case of Camp 307--if this information is accurate, maybe we'll uncover something. But I can't confirm the deeds of previous governments."

Toon: "I'm grateful for that statement, General, and it's important to us to establish the fates of U.S. POWs from Korea. Other questions will be discussed further in working group sessions. Regarding Vietnam, General, as you know, the question of Vietnam War POWs is one of the most emotional questions for the American people, and its been so for two decades down to today. The document you gave us in April, signed by Quang, raised questions as to the number of POWs Vietnam may actually have held. We share your view, General, that the document was an authentic GRU report, but our analysts have concluded that the number of POWs cited in the document was not accurate. We hope we will be able to review any judgement that your analysts might have made at the time this document was received in Moscow. I hope all related documents will be given to us."

"Also, it's important to receive all of the information relevant to POW/MIAs in the 6-volume GRU study on the Vietnam War and in all of the air defense manuals and texts developed from the Vietnam experience."

"Again, General, I want to make it clear to you today as in the past, our objective is not to obtain intelligence, but humanitarian in nature, to obtain answers for family members, and that's all. I'd like to say a word or two, General, about our previous requests--we understand there was a Russian Government investigation into the names that appeared in the snow last fall and related circumstances. And you mentioned in your remarks the joint expedition to the Kurils and Sakhalin on U.S. POWs maltreated and buried there in WWII. You said you'd provide us with all information, including that from eyewitnesses. Meanwhile, we have heard of no other information to allow us to investigate the allegations effectively. I hope we'll resolve this issue in the near future."

"On Afghanistan, we've said over the past 17 months that this is a strictly humanitarian mission. In light of this, we are doing all we can regarding your missing servicemen. In December, I reported to you in detail on our efforts on behalf of your servicemen in Afghanistan. We passed you further information in April. We continue to raise this issue at every opportunity in the region, particularly in Pakistan. In March, our ambassador asked President Rabani to do everything possible to secure their release. Our DCM from Islamabad is in Kabul for discussions--we asked him to urge the Afghan Government to account for and win the release of Russians held in Afghanistan. If our DCM has anything to report, we will pass it to you immediately. We've also been working to obtain the release of the five border guards captured in July--but I'm told they were released yesterday. Unfortunately, on the Afghan issue, the continuing deterioration in Afghanistan and the clashes on the Tadjik border make it nearly impossible to obtain new information--but we'll keep on trying."

"You mentioned Soviet aircraft losses in your remarks--we're working hard to account for Soviet aircraft lost in the Cold War. In April, we provided you with reports from JCS on Soviet aircraft losses near U.S. territory. Today, I'm pleased to provide you with a final report. In addition, I have a document for you on a case not addressed .in.'the..JCS report, but which was found in our archives on the IL-12 shootdown during the-Korean War. The Joint Chiefs reports did not included the IL-12 because we consider it a Korean War, not a Cold War, case. As you know, several U.S. member of the Commission visited the memorial to the downing in Vladivostok in December. We hope you will provide us with any additional information you hold on these Cold War cases so we can explore our own archives."

"Finally, we have important information on the Golf-class submarine lost in 1968 in the Pacific. You said in private conversation that some reports in this country said that the Golf- class submarine sank because of a collision with one of our submarines. At my request, U.S. Naval intelligence searched the logs of all U.S. subs that were active in 1968. As a result, our director of Naval intelligence has concluded that no U.S. sub was within 300 nautical miles of your sub when it sank. Recently, General, we learned that the sub's bell had been recovered. I strongly believe that we must be as honest with you as we ask you to be with us about our POW/MIAs. Both I and my colleague Strobe Talbott asked CIA Director Woolsey to allow us to present this bell to you. I'd planned to present it to Primakov at our meeting, but I've been told that Primakov has left town--I hope this is not a repetition of the behavior I experienced while ambassador. I recall my experience when I asked to meet Mr. Romanov in Leningrad, but was told that Romanov had been called to Archangelsk to put down a serious uprising, and- he clearly just avoided me. In another case, I visited Kiev and asked to meet Mr. Shcherbitsky. As in the previous case, an appointment was made. I arrived, only to be told that Shcherbitsky had been called away to help with the harvest. You know as well as I do that the Party Secretary doesn't help with the harvest. I tell you these stories to amuse you and to underscore the difference today, and I'm sure Mr. Primakov has a legitimate reason to be out of town, and I'll present the bell to his deputy at lunch. I thought, in the meantime, it would be interesting for you to have a look at the bell."

[Matt Bryza of the Department of State brought the bell to the head table.]

Volkogonov: "I'm sure we'll find a place for it in a museum. It's an important memorial and I'm deeply gratified. We'll tell the relatives."

Toon: "Frankly, I must tell you it was not easy to get the bell, and I can understand your difficulties in getting information. But I feel strongly, General, you and I should do all we can to remove bureaucratic obstacles to our Commission. In this new era of U.S.--Russian partnership, we're willing to do everything possible to assist you in determining the fates of your service members who didn't come home, and we know you'll do the same. As you know, over a year or so, we prepared biweekly reports of the work of the Joint Committee--I want to hand them over-to you so you better understand our work."

[Ambassador Toon hands over back issues of the TFR Biweekly Report.]

Colonel Mazurov (Foreign Intelligence Service, Formerly KGB): "I'd like to clarify something about Primakov. Primakov and I were resting in a sanitorium. I was recalled from leave--but the administration would not permit Primakov to leave. The rules allow patients to leave only on Saturday and Sunday, not on weekdays."

"Well, we were adversaries, but now we're friends. We've noted from the documents you gave us that you have the impression that some U.S. POWs from Korea were transported to the Soviet Union. We studied your report--sixty per cent of the information was obtained from ex-prisoners. Bear in mind that such people know that the dirtier the information, the better it will be received in the West. But we have no indications that any of this was done. And, as far as I know, my CIA colleagues have no official documents showing that U.S. POWs were taken to the Soviet Union. As for the value of information from ex-prisoners, we saw the value of information from that ex-prisoner from the Pechora camp. These prisoners have their own axes to grind. The files do not bear out the charges. Now, regarding secret operations of the CIA and KGB in Russian and America, recently I met U.S. Co-Chairman Mr. Manstein [as heard] and I told him that the Soviet side will pass on all relevant information to the American side,

even though a great many documents exist--but you know the U.S. side will delay delivering its relevant information."

"We've been working together for one and a half years, but we haven't received a single official document from you from which to work. Let me stress again, the CIA has not given us a single official document, not even something from ex-prisoners."

Toon: "I didn't say we had any official information. I simply said that, based on information from interviews with all sorts of people, we have a feeling that this happened. Having said that, I have to say I thought I knew the Soviet Union pretty well as ambassador and I feel that the relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang was such that, if the opportunity existed to use POWs, Moscow would have taken it. But this can be discussed in the working groups. Finally, I assure you I know there's a legitimate reason Mr. Primakov can't meet with me. I told those stories about Romanov and Shcherbitsky just to underline how different our relationship is today."

Mazurov: "We have to stop paying attention to information from ex-inmates because they are unreliable. The relevant information can be had from official sources.

Volkogonov: "Let' s take a ten-minute coffee break. "

[The session breaks for twenty-two minutes]

Volkogonov: "Let' s continue working until our lunch break. Let' s listen to short reports for thirty to forty minutes. Any questions on the two reports we just heard? Later, we'll break down into working groups.

Osipov: "My presentation of Cold War shootdowns will come separately during the working group session. Now I want to clarify a point on the F-86 issue raised by Ambassador Toon. As General Volkogonov said, the aircraft was, indeed, delivered. description was done, and this report is in one of the research institutes, but they can't find it. But we have found the pilot who forced the aircraft to land--he says the U.S. pilot died in the force-down. He's an old man living in Moscow. Some of us know him, and, if we can contact him, we'll bring him to tomorrow's session. On the Yerevan shootdown, General Volkogonov gave you the details. With regard to Vladivostok, we are ready to work in detail in the working group.

Volkogonov: "It was forced down by a Soviet pilot, but there were Koreans everywhere on the ground. It was forced down on the coast, where it's rocky, and it was a rough landing. Our pilot inquired and was told the U.S. pilot died, but he did not see it personally. The aircraft was dismantled, because the design bureau was interested in sub-assemblies. We contacted the design bureau to try to locate knowledgeable personnel. I think they may find some documents.

Professor Orlov: "There' s additional information. Here' s the pilot ' s picture in *U.S. News and World Report.* Our pilot was a famous pilot who downed 20 aircraft--during the attack he shot down the F-86, but the U.S. pilot managed to land near the coast on North Korean territory. The North Koreans rushed to the site. A boat approached and the pilot was taken away. But there are several different versions of the tale. Supposedly, the aircraft was taken to a tunnel by the North Koreans. The U.S. tried to bomb the transport unit, the Koreans got it into the tunnel, disassembled it, and shipped it north. In another version, the pilot Avakumov says the transport of the aircraft he shot down was bombed. It's difficult to say exactly which aircraft was delivered to Moscow. My question is this--why is there conflicting information in the U.S. press on the number of prisoners and missing? The document you provided to us in April says 8,200 POW/MIAs. *U.S. News and World* Report says 10,218 POW/MIAs. From them, only 3,746 returned. According to Colonel Corso, who worked on this issue in Korea, about 500 POWs died of wounds and diseases. And there's other different information. Does the U.S. side have exact information on the number of POWs taken?"

Toon: "I'll let Mr. Kauzlarich answer that."

Kauzlarich: "We'd like to base our discussions on the report we've completed, and part of it records our methodology for accounting for our POWs from Korea. But I can tell you it's a very difficult process to arrive at exact numbers. But you'll see the methodology we used to arrive at the numbers cited in this report."

Toon: "I would like to comment on the report of the F-86 transferred to Moscow. It seems to me that, if the North Koreans were prepared to give you the F-86, you must have been given access to POWs who had information on F-86s at the same time. And this illustrates why it is difficult for some to believe you did not have a good number of U.S. POWs in your custody during the Korean War. If you could get your hands on an F-86, you could get your hands on POWs. I'd like your comment on this."

Volkogonov: "A few words: My colleague Colonel Mukhin will pass you documents today about interrogations by Soviets. Ninety per cent of the information obtained was purely technical, not political or military. It was technical data on aircraft, take-off weight, engine specifications, and so forth. Unfortunately, while what you say is quite logical, we have no evidence of POWs used in our laboratories or elsewhere--and, as far as we know, there were no laboratories in this Camp 307 in Yakutia. But there was a special organization, I suspect, to get this information."

Toon: "I'd like to call upon Mr. Kauzlarich."

Kauzlarich: "General Volkogonov, without going into details for the working group, maybe I can shed a little light on this. Our analysis is premised upon the belief that pilots of F-86s were treated differently than other POWs. In some cases, they were kept separately from other POWs, and we believe that some of them were taken directly to the Soviet Union without contact with other prisoners. So it's quite possible that POWs existed, such as those in Camp 307, who were not pilots and had nothing to do with F-86s--and we will present the results of some interviews we had with design bureau members from Sukhoi and MiG, where they say they believe that some of the information they had was from pilots, and, in one case, where a colleague of one, now dead, claimed to have participated in an interview with a pilot. So, to focus our work, we will spend considerable time on the issue of F-86 pilots and the explanation of why they were treated differently."

Volkogonov: "That's interesting information, but it needs to be confirmed."

Mukhin: "I will speak of this during the working group session, but, briefly, most of the shootdowns of 1,057 aircraft were F-86s. The pilots from these aircraft were not kept separately, but, we think--and we only got our information through the Chinese and North Koreans, since we received strict no-contact instructions-- but we're speaking of perishable information, of operational data, so there would have been no transport because it wouldn't have been timely. Later, no one would have wanted the bother of transporting them."

Toon: "I have one suggestion--Congressman Peterson will be with us at lunch--I suggest the Vietnam working group start after-3:15 so he can be there."

Volkogonov: "All right. Shall we have lunch right now? "

Toon: "All right."

Volkogonov: "I have a suggestion. Since we made a sudden decision to hold working group sessions, the session on Korea will be held right here. Vietnam and the Cold War will be on Old Square. If my American colleagues agree, we can sit together in the hall and discuss things. Whatever you prefer."

Congressman Peterson: "I think, since some people must work in different groups, we should try to do everything here in the conference area.

Volkogonov: "In ten minutes, there will be lunch in the buffet."

[At this time, the session broke down into individual conversations. Upon Mr. Clift's suggestion, it was agreed that the Cold War Working Group would not meet until the following day, 1 Sept, at 10 A.M.]

ANNEX B TO JCSB TRIWEEKLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 21 AUGUST -- 10 SEPTEMBER 1993

SUBJECT: Transcript of Korean Working Group Sessions of the U.S./Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, Tuesday, 31 August and Wednesday, 1 September, 1993.

Note: The 31 August session convened at 1430 in the "Malyi Zal," Kremlin Building #14, the "Hall of Government Meetings."

31 August 1993:

Colonel Mukhin: "I recommend we do things this way: first we, as hosts, give our new findings and you ask your questions. Then we will hear from the American side."

"Dear colleagues, it is my pleasure to see fellow officers in uniform opposite me. Today, reading General Loeffke's letter, well, I really read it with pleasure. I hope it helps us find a common language."

"In our military archives, from the First of April, 1992 to the Twenty-fifth of August, 1993, 42 workers from our worked on this problem. They examined 8,202 archive files from the military archives, and identified 1,872 pages of interest. The interrogation documents, in particular, were interesting. This matter was complex and also had a political character." "We have given you two lists based on those papers. Then we gave you a list at our last session based on information from our air defense forces. Today, we have worked through thousands of fat files and we've produced a list of 1,057 cases of U.S. shootdowns. This list gives information about air-to-air battles, with dates, times, types of aircraft engaged, the area, and even some data on crew fates. In most cases, however, we found that the fate of the crew was unknown. Still, some pilots were taken prisoner, some were rescued on water or land by U.S. ships and helicopters. In some cases, indicators exist of the place of death and burial of crew members. This will be valuable for the relatives of the dead crew members."

"Now, a few words on the Cold War, although it's a separate issue. We prepared information on U.S. violations of USSR airspace--we gave you a lot of information and, just lately, the photographs from the Yerevan shootdown. I want to underline one more time that no evidence exists on the transfer of U.S. prisoners during the Korean War or the Cold War. Our archival workers did all that was possible to exhaust the sources and carry out our humanitarian mission. Sometimes it would help to get the reaction of the U.S. side on how our information helps you, how it helps the families. Do these documents help or not? Did they help the families? In fact, we need a response to cheer up our archival workers, to convince them that their work is not in vain.

"The American side needs to be understanding about our request regarding the fates of missing Soviet and Russian personnel. The Ministry of Defense said that, in the Cold War, it suffered the greatest losses. The Cold War was hot for the military. The Ministry of Defense has handed over the greatest number of documents--that is why we think we are fairly entitled to your assistance. I speak, above all, to those in uniform."

"Now, let me hand over the documents to which I referred. They're on Korea and the Cold War."

Kauzlarich: "I assume the Cold War Group will get the same information?"

Mukhin: "I think they will. "

Kauzlarich: "Thanks. I notice many familiar faces on the Russian side, but let us introduce the members of the U.S. side."

[Introductions followed.]

Mukhin: "Well, I suppose the Russian side should introduce itself, as well."

[The Russian side consisted of MG Krayushkin, Departmental Chief in the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS); Colonel Vinogradov, deputy to Krayushkin; Colonel Mazurov of the FIS; Colonel Mukhin, Chief of the Archives of the General Staff; Professor Orlov, Professor of History and Korea and Cold War veteran; Mr. Sokolov, Deputy Chief of Historical Documents for the Foreign Ministry; MG Zaporoshchenko, Director of the Russian State Military Archives; and Colonel Brilov, Chief of the Central Military Archives;]

Kauzlarich: "We have done our analysis based on your material, on our own archival materials, and on interviews. I would like to give you copies of this product--it's the basis for our presentation this afternoon. It will give you a summary of our work, our methodology. I want to focus on a small subset of these POWs--specifically, on the F-86 pilots. And I would like to present our case that U.S. POWs were held as political hostages or as a source of technical labor in the GULag. Finally, I would like to suggest some questions that might throw light on this issue."

"I hope this mutual exchange will help us. To re-state some points made by Ambassador Toon this morning, we are not looking for intelligence information. We are interested only in the fate of our POWs. I'd like to start with the confirmed Soviet efforts to acquire our F-86 aircraft and our assertion that F-86 pilots were taken to the Soviet Union."

"As we agreed this morning, there was a major effort to capture F-86s intact. We had discussions this morning, as well as with Colonel-General Lobov and Colonels Plotnikov and Sosinov, and LTC Klimovich of the KGB, all of whom confirm that this operation was a success. Also, we know that in 1951 a special detachment of the Soviet Air Force arrived in China. This unit's mission was to capture an F-86 intact. Finally, we have reports from the Sukhoi and MiG design bureaus that the intact F-86s were transferred."

"As we discuss this aspect of the issue, it's important to find out the tail numbers of these F-86s. That would allow us to match the aircraft with pilots. We have to believe that, in addition to the efforts to capture the aircraft, there were efforts to capture F-86 pilots. General Lobov and Colonel Bushuyev said the special unit was also charged with capturing F-86 pilots. General Lobov said he had 70 teams searching for pilots. Also, Major Amirov, a military journalist, says the MGB issued a directive in 1952 to capture F-86 pilots."

"As a minimum, we believe that F-86 pilots were interrogated directly by Soviets. We interviewed two Americans, both of whom were interrogated by Soviets at that time. Lieutenant Roland Parks was an F-86 pilot who crashed in China and was turned over to Soviets in Port Arthur for two weeks of interrogation. A Marine corporal, Nick Flores, was mistaken for a recently-shot-down F-86 pilot. He was captured by Soviet anti-aircraft artillery troops and interrogated at the Soviet airbase in Antung."

"We also learned from a former officer in the Chinese People's Army, Mr. Shu Ping Wa, that it was policy to turn over pilots to the Soviets. He says he personally turned over three U.S. pilots to ten Soviets. Also, we have from the Russian side, colonels Sozinov and Bushuyev, who say they personally interrogated Americans. One of these, Lieutenant Neimann, was never declared a POW by the Communist side and was never returned. All of this is covered in greater detail in the report, including other examples, as well."

"Finally, we believe there is evidence that-some of the pilots were taken to the Soviet Union. LTC Klimovich says that a friend of his who died said that at least one pilot was brought to Moscow along with his aircraft. As mentioned by the ambassador, a designer at Sukhoi says a pilot participated in research on an F- 86 "

"Finally, Major Shifrin says that a friend, General Zagadze, moved six pilots from North Korea to Kansk.

There are some interesting features regarding our data on F-86 losses. Without arguing over the number lost, it's interesting to note that most captured pilots who didn't die in prison returned--with one statistical aberration. The number of F-86 pilots MIA related to the rates of other aircraft crews at that time is greater. Of 56 F-86s downed, 15 live pilots returned and one set of remains was returned. In another 9 cases, circumstances indicate that the pilots died--"

Mazurov: "Returned from what country?"

Kauzlarich: "From North Korea. Of the 31 remaining pilots, the conditions were such that survival was possible. This 55% MIA rate is unusually high compared to losses from other types of aircraft. This is described in detail in the report."

"To say a few words about the second set of U.S. POWs--our belief is that other POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. There are certain presumptions we make--first, the experience with Axis POWs from World War II established a precedent for holding POWs for exploitation. One of the documents you provided to us on the Stalin/Chou-en-Lai meeting in September, 1952, described Stalin's recommendation that the Chinese withhold 20% of their POWs. Third, we know that South Korean POWs were sent to the Soviet Union. A Soviet Lieutenant-General of Korean origin, Kan San Kho, says he assisted in the transfer of thousands of South Koreans to camps in the USSR. His testimony suggests that other U.N. POWs could have been sent to the USSR."

"Colonel Korotkov says that Soviet military specialists had authorization to question U.S. POWs in two stages. First, in North Korea itself, with the transfer of some to the Soviet Union for further interrogation. He believed that several hundred may have been transported through Khabarovsk. In Appendix F of our paper, we have a list of Soviet officials who were involved in the interrogations or have knowledge of them. We believe some of these individuals might still be alive and we would like to talk to them."

"Also, we have information from our own archives and sources contemporary to the Korean War. LTC Corso is the most prominent of the sources for this information. He has told our interviewers that hundreds of U.S. POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union through the rail transhipment point at Manchouli. This was confirmed in 1954 by a Soviet citizen who said he was an eyewitness."

"Captain Mel Giles reported that 63 U.S. POWs were shipped from Pyongyang to Chita in 1952. This led to a decision by the U.S. Air Force to cancel airstrikes on the rail line to avoid harming U.S. POWs. Also, we have records from the U.S. Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance that show transfers of POWs continued through the war.

"Finally, there is the report of journalist Zygmund Nagorski, who reported detailed information on the transfer of hundreds of POWs to the Soviet Union. He claimed this information came from officials of the MGB and the Trans-Siberian Railway."

"Finally, to talk about the testimony of former inmates or the GULag. I'm sorry that our colleague Mazurov is no longer here. As outlined in the report, testimony from numerous foreign inmates of the GULag states that they met U.S. Korean War POWs in prison camps. Indeed, we received new information this past weekend. It came as a result of a joint interview. Without going into all of the interviews, our conclusion is that the greatest concentration of sightings was in the Komi ASSR. There was also a significant number of sightings near Irkutsk and Khabarovsk."

"Our conclusion is very clear. We believe that the evidence concerning the transfer of Korean War POWs is both compelling and abundant. We believe it cannot be explained away. Our report suggests that we need your help in gaining information from the archives of the security services, as well as interviews with individuals listed in the report appendix. Our report suggests several new areas of work. Our work with inmates of the GULag suggests that the names and identities of POWs were changed. Where in the archives might we find such information? Second, the design bureaus might have information in their archives. There might be information in Komi, Khabarovsk and in the Irkutsk Mining Archives, in the archives of the Ministries of Civil Aviation, Coal, Uranium and Railroads."

"In summary, we feel very, very strongly that there should be more information available because this is more than just circumstantial evidence we have assembled. In the discussions, we have some specific recommendations as to where you might find information."

Mukhin: "Thank you for this very detailed and clear report on problems concerning the Korean War. I believe this document transferred today contains all, and the representatives of all the ministries have listened attentively. For my part, I'd like to throw light on the military aspects--and then Professor Orlov could say a few words as an eyewitness. Then the security services can speak about the labor camps."

"But first, the military issue. Concerning F-86.pilots kept separately, we didn't see it, there is no evidence. The problem of studying the aircraft and pilot here in the Soviet Union would have been tougher that just doing it there in Korea. You said General Lobov planned and organized to capture F-86s and crews to bring them back. After our last meeting, I paid special attention to this and studied documents from Lobov's 64th Corps. .I looked at the documents of the 'technical services' of the corps, who would have needed this information. Unfortunately, there is absolutely nothing in the documents. The corps was sent to China. It wouldn't have been wise to send groups into Korea and to organize the transport of aircraft under conditions of this difficulty."

"Concerning the interrogations--we were strictly ordered not to have any contact with captured pilots. I've seen four very high level documents, from corps level to general staff, with this order. And whenever local commanders asked for permission to interrogate directly, it was categorically refused. In my view, this was because we did not want to further worsen relations with the U.S. It's one thing when aircraft meet in the air, MiG-15s with our pilots but with Korean insignia, but contact with translators or interrogators directly was a different thing. There would have been grave consequences--but witnesses do say it. I can only say that there is nothing in the documents. That is my point of view.

Kauzlarich: "Just to repeat a point, we know of two cases of Americans who were interrogated by Soviet officers, Flores and Lieutenant Parks."

Volkogonov: "Can I say a few words before I go to see Filatov with Ambassador Toon? I've listened to your report. The logic is interesting. If you permit, tomorrow I'll say a few things about this subject."

[Volkogonov left with Ms. Trudy Peterson.]

LTC Freeman: "In the Nick Flores case, the local commander did not interrogate him but trucked him for five hours to Antung.

Mukhin: "But that was in China."

Freeman: "Yes."

Mukhin: "But, as for eyewitnesses, I suspect there were violations of the General Staff orders in order to give fresher information. But they wouldn't have recorded it. Let me turn to Professor Orlov."

Orlov: "I looked through your report and found some discrepancies. On page 4, it says I was chief of an intelligence organization in the 64th Corps--but I was only an intelligence officer. On page 4, its says the intelligence center in Sary Shagan belonged to the KGB--that's wrong, it belonged to Air Defense and not to the KGB. On page 28, Colonel Korotkov stated he had personally interviewed LTC Black, but that was me."

"Now, I would like to divide my presentation into two parts, as a participant and as a researcher. As a participant, I can only confirm what Viktor Mukhin said: there were strict orders against personal contact with U.S. POWs. As Colonel Mukhin correctly said, there are no rules without exceptions. But with Flores and Parks, we're talking about interrogations on Chinese territory, where Soviet troops were deployed openly. Prisoners captured in North Korea were a different issue. This was all done to avoid showing Soviet participation in the war."

"Soviet pilots were prohibited from flying above the Yellow Sea or south of the 38th Parallel. They were all dressed in the uniforms of Chinese volunteers. The pilots had Russian transliterations of Chinese words of command. Our advisors wore civilian clothes in Korea. If they met foreigners, they introduced themselves as reporters. Here we touch on a big political problem. Of course, the Americans knew Russian pilots were fighting them. They heard all the radio traffic in Russian, with lots of Russian swear words, and they saw each other's faces through the canopies. Yet, the U.S. command and your political leaders never made these facts public. Why? Because they didn't want the public's wrath directed at the Soviet Union."

"As for the F-86, it was the only aircraft of U.S. production So, its tactics and that was a rival to the MiG-15. So its tactics and characteristics were very important to the 64th Corps. We had a group of officers sent from the General Staff to the 64th Corps specifically to find out about those planes. First, we had to organize radio intercept to track take-offs in order to allow our pilots to intercept them. But, in April 1951, when there was heavy fighting over An Kun [sp?] around the 7th and 12th of April, we first started capturing pilots and gear from F-86 Sabres. It was critical to us to get Sabre information."

"First of all, we needed to know about the pressure suits, the range-finders, the MK-18 site, the catapult and rescue system... and I was sent from China with a now-deceased friend to North Korea in April 1951. Our mission was to clarify these issues."

"The North Koreans kept all of the prisoners in their camps. We didn't know where they were. We organized our work. The air advisor to the Korean Army staff, Colonel Petrochev and the intelligence advisor--I don't know what happened to him--well, Colonel Petrochev told us what was needed. He gave us a list of questions, which we then wrote out in English, and the Koreans gave us a list of POWs. They were listed by specialty, not as individuals, but as navigators, pilots and so forth. We sent the questions to the POWs based on their specialties. We would hand over the questions to the Koreans and they brought back the answers. Then he would compile reports and forward them to corps."

"But sometimes, as Colonel Mukhin said, we had to break the rules to get information quickly. That's why we met with POWs directly a few times.

"I took part in two such cases, and perhaps the others who replaced me did the same. In one case, that of LTC Black, the subject matter was not intelligence but political. It was for an article in Pravda, to 'reveal' the bad Americans. The reporter, Kravchenko, didn't know English, so he invited me to serve as his interpreter. We were in civilian clothes. We drove for two hours or so--there were no interviews at headquarters--but I don't recall exactly where the interview took place. The article was published on 14 August 1951."

"In the other case it was critical to get information to the design bureau on the range-finder and thusly, in the same manner, away from headquarters, we met a young pilot, maybe twenty years old, and had a long discussion. We tried to make corrections to the design we had. And that was all. The other contacts were through the North Koreans. Then we returned to Antung and worked radio intercept again."

"But as for situations in which Soviets in uniform conducted interrogations? I don't know about a single case. We simply didn't have our uniforms."

Kauzlarich: "How long did you do this work? "

Orlov: "From late May to early July 1951. About two months. We were only interested in this operational information."

Kauzlarich: "But what about the others who did the work after you? Through the war?"

Orlov: "Obviously, according to the protocols, there were others. But I can't locate even the protocols concerning me in the archives. It's probably because these weren't formal documents or We just wanted technical data. For formal interrogations, example, at what distance could an F-86 engage? How did pilots

That's why those interrogations were not fight G-stress? preserved."

"Of course, later, others did this work. But they probably worked under the same informal system.

"Speaking of the F-86, it was of great interest to us. We shipped back all of the instruments we captured immediately. But not whole aircraft. We were just interested in key instruments. The F-86 was just taken from a Messerschmidt prototype, and we knew about that. But, as for 50 pilots out of which only 15 came back, I think they died because the ejection system, especially at first, was rather poor.

Freeman: "I'd like to apologize for the error on page 4. It's my fault entirely. On page 16, the issue of Sary Shagan, we might have had more accurate information if Major Amirov had been allowed to talk to the Commission."

Orlov: "Maj or Amirov might have been KGB- - the guards out there were KGB, the site itself was Air Defense."

Freeman: "Concerning LTC Black, you said you arranged the interview--were you a part of Korotkov's analytical group?"

Orlov: "No. Never. I never knew Korotkov back then. Korotkov was never in Korea or China."

Major Peters: "So there were at least two systems working? "

Orlov: "At least. More. You know there were different levels of intelligence working. Now on interrogations. What do you call an interrogation? I just had questions. Some were translated from Chinese."

Mukhin: "Last time we also handed over documents..."

Orlov: "I must also mention that, in my two cases, we didn't really see it as a formal interrogation. No "fist hammering." I found a receipt for a brothel on one subject, for instance.

Freeman: "Back to the interrogations. We reviewed all of the packets you gave us. We found gaps where files are missing. We have provided General Volkogonov with the special pages and file numbers that contain information on missing Americans. In other words, we believe we can identify special files and even pages where you have not handed over information--we can even identify the names.

Mukhin: "I can answer now. Mr. Kauzlarich must remember that neither side knew what was needed--Brilev would bring over huge files and we'd give them to Osipov, and Osipov was sunk under those piles. But now our work is more systematic, and we are ready to provide everything. It was just a result of the messy first days."

Kauzlarich: "This is why it's important to work together."

Orlov: "I have a question. In the Official U.S. Air Force History of the Air War in Korea, it says there were 249 airmen prisoners of war and only 35 didn't return. My question is this: we would like to have those 35 names."

Freeman: "We think it's 31. The list is in Appendix B."

Mukhin: Another question: as stated before, we'll work in a joint manner. Since we're on the subject of Korea, my question is this: On the 18th of November 1952, 30 kilometers south of Cape Gamov, there was an air battle involving U.S. planes and four MiG 15's. One of ours returned, a second crashed off-shore, but the fate of the other two is unknown. We know the U.S. aircraft were from a carrier one hundred kilometers distant and cannot exclude the possibility that the U.S. planes lost course and violated Soviet airspace. Thus four MiGs scrambled. Can you give us pilot reports from this incident? 18

November 1952?"

Freeman: "There's another case, same day. On page 64. Could it be the same incident?"

Kauzlarich: "Even if it's not the same, we should be able to track it. If you have documents, they'd help us check our own records--we had an incident on the same day."

Mukhin: "I'll give you a sketch tomorrow, with the carrier, the flight paths and so forth."

Kauzlarich: "This is precisely the type of work we can do together."

Freeman: "You said Air Defense units of the 64th Corps were not deployed in Korea?"

Mukhin: "Aviation was not, but several anti-aircraft artillery batteries were in Korea."

Orlov: "Another question. In October, 1950, when U.S. forces moved north, four U.S. aircraft attacked a Soviet airfield named "Dry River." This event is well-known. Was it deliberate, or by mistake?"

Freeman: "I believe it was an error. It was a bad Naval Aviation screw-up.

Mukhin: "Our historians asked me to ask you--we had an ace, three times a Hero of the Soviet Union. During World War II, he shot down more than 300 German planes. He was sent to Korea, and he flew some sorties well south of the 38th Parallel. He was a real hooligan. And three U.S. aircraft boxed him and led him to an airfield, but, just as he was landing, he did a hard turn and escaped. He survived the war. They say he cursed so badly in the air that the air people listening said they never heard such a thing. It happened. I want to know--is it in American documents?"

Freeman: "Do you have the date?"

Orlov: "I was in Kozhedub's division. We fought there longer than any other unit. And our pilots had no rest at first. Kozhedub was prohibited from flying, but once he broke the ban and flew to a forbidden area and--it's like a legend, this story that U.S. pilots boxed him in. But I know the flight supervisor. He begged him, 'Ivan, I have children, come back.' And he returned."

Freeman: "I have some questions about the aircraft brought back to Moscow. You said one was brought to the Sukhoi Design Bureau. Our information says it may have been more than one. In any event, when it reached the design bureau, all markings had been removed. Is there any information as to what those markings were? For example, you provided documents in April and, in one case, an aircraft had been shot down and all you had was a tail number. But we have a list to match the tail number to the pilot. It would be useful if you could provide information on aircraft taken to the design bureaus. The information I'm describing is in the document we just gave you. Look at inclosure 31. From the tail number you provided, we figured out it was Lieutenant Knott."

LTC Tikhomirov (TFR): "At the Sukhoi Institute , they told us that two aircraft had been brought in, one in mint condition, one blown to bits. But there were no markings because first they had been to the Chalovsky Institute."

Mukhin: "We are interested in comparing loss data, so we can see how archives compare.

Freeman: "We still have to analyze the new documents, but I'd like to raise the issue of the interrogations you just gave us. It looks like they're on the same personnel--maybe it's different information?"

Mukhin: "The documents I gave you today were not given to you earlier--maybe names from the list are confusing you?"

Kauzlarich: "We need to meet tomorrow and we'll have a chance to look at these documents. Now, we do

seem to have a match between one of the aircraft returned to Moscow and a missing pilot. What you and General Volkogonov talked about today sounds like the case of Captain Albert Tenney."

Mukhin: "18 November?"

Kauzlarich: "No. This is different. It's a forced landing, 3 May 1952. It's interesting. Among the documents you gave us in

December was information about a chitbook from a crash on that same day."

Freeman: "It' s listed under 'Personal Effects of a Flyer.'"

Kauzlarich: "If it was Tenney's effects, and he was on the 59 list, it seems he might have been one of those pilots who were brought back."

Mukhin: "Of course, all of those pilots passed through North Korean and Chinese hands. I don't think our archivists would have those documents from the Koreans or the Chinese. Now, we seem to be passing to the issue of U.S. POWs in camps. Whom would you like to see tomorrow?"

Peters: "Comrade Mazurov and his people."

Kauzlarich: "And there' s the issue General Volkogonov raised--there might have been other systems operating, from other offices of the Ministry of Defense or the security services."

Mukhin: "Korotkov's system was interested in the morale of troops and that sort of thing, not in technical data."

Kauzlarich: "And that's the system we're interested in. "

Mukhin: "Their focus was narrow--for propaganda. They were part of the Ministry of Defense, so their documents have been studied. Some of the documents were in the political archives. And then we just found random names from Chinese radio broadcasts and the like.

Freeman: (to Professor Orlov) "Sir, in April you said that information on POWs was still being declassified. You cited a Second Lieutenant Michael DeMoyne, Lieutenant Smith and Lieutenant Harvey."

Orlov: "That was a misunderstanding. LTC Troyan asked me about it. It wasn't me. I think it was Korotkov. I only knew the name of Black. Now I understand that my documents weren't formal, so those documents were lost. Anyway, no names were included."

Kauzlarich: "So You only reported information, not names?"

Orlov: "Exactly. We wrote, 'POWs said that...'"

Freeman: "Then how did you evaluate the information, without knowing the sources?"

Orlov: "What was important was the information, not names. Our reports would have given the specialties, pilot navigator..."

Freeman: "But you need to know the education level, experience, their qualification on different aircraft..."

Orlov: "The North Koreans gave us that. They already had it. Usually, it was just like that. But the Second World War was different, of course. We used a standard form. But in Korea, we used to send the same questions to several people. Then we gave a generalized report."

Freeman: "How could you tell which information came from which source?"

Orlov: "We had records by specialty and there was a general list of all those interrogated at the beginning or end of the report.

Freeman: "But some information would have been better than other information, based on the source.

Orlov: "Of course. If we would have been interested in further interrogations--but we weren't interested in that. We just did hasty interrogations."

Freeman: "But how would higher levels know whom to pursue further?"

Orlov: "You see, we were working for the corps. Then there was the air advisor, Petrochev, whom I mentioned. He worked with the Koreans and he was subordinate to the General Staff. He was probably interested in broader matters."

Freeman: "Do you know the name 'Kuznetsov'? He prepared questions for the interrogation of U.S. pilots. It was in 1950."

Orlov: "It seems strange to me, since in 1950 there were no POW pilots. The first aerial combat between U.S. and Soviet pilots took place on 17 December 1950. When our people arrived in 1951, those listed here, I was already gone. It was the second shift."

Freeman: "But your description of how you conducted the interrogations seems strange. They could have lied to you and you wouldn't have known."

Orlov: "That' s why we sent the same questions to different people in different camps. In April, 1951, we were told to find out about the pressure suits and the range-finder as quickly as possible...well, probably we put down some names--I don't remember."

Freeman: "But the information you provided must have been in messages, in some form..."

Orlov: "Yes, of course. But our information went to corps. Information also came from other sources, from reconaissance, from the air staff--corps had to weigh it all."

Freeman: "Our information is from 1951 and later--perhaps the system had formalized by then?"

Orlov: "Sure. Our group was the first and, after the tenth of July, 1951 when the talks started...after the ceasefire, our work was terminated. Then it resumed when the war didn't stop. I know Colonel Petrochev, the air force advisor, had a steady Korean translator. We were temporary. Perhaps they processed all the data from various sources."

Kauzlarich: "That raises an interesting question. The process could have changed through time. Perhaps further on through time the system might have been very different--including personal contact."

Orlov: "I'm a historian and speak only about what I know. I'm careful with 'ifs.'"

Mukhin: "Every year the no-contact order went out."

Freeman: "But no-contact where? In Korea? In China? "

Mukhin: "We were pretending we weren't there."

Freeman "Even in China?"

Orlov: "No, in China Air Force Marshall Krysovski and the air force unit were there per agreement. We

were in Port Arthur, in Shanghai... and there contact was allowed. But everything in Korea was controlled."

Freeman: "That's consistent with the Nick Flores case, where he was taken to China."

[Peters briefly covered the history of the Flores case with the Russians. This is not given verbatim here, since Peters was the note-taker and had to cease copying while explaining the situation.]

Orlov: "They probably took advantage of an opportunity. All movements were hindered by the U.S. Air Force. Maybe a trip which usually took half an hour took five hours."

Osipov enters and interrupts: "We only have this conference room reserved until 1730."

Kauzlarich: "I do want to get back together tomorrow morning. You wanted to know if your information was useful--the morale of your staff should be high, since you see how we've used it. Second, we will take any information on your losses and try to match it up with our records. This morning, Ambassador Toon passed you some information that covers up to the '80s, but we're ready to look at anything. If it helps resolve the fates of Soviet service members, we're ready to help."

Mukhin: "Thank you. But now, among us servicemen--the bell. It belongs to the Navy--why did you give it to the security services? You should have given it to us. Its proper place is in the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg."

Kauzlarich: "This was a direct result of a covenant between Woolsey and Primakov."

Mukhin: "Yes. The security service people all want to be pals."

Kauzlarich: "The most important thing to us was to get the bell back to Russia."

Mukhin: "Thank you. We'll meet again tomorrow at ten." Korean War Working Group, Second Session, Wednesday, 1 September 1993, Malyi Zal, Kremlin Building # 14."

Mukhin: "I think we made a good start yesterday. We'll carry on today. The American side should start."

Kauzlarich: "I agree that yesterday was a good start, and we truly regard this as a joint effort in which we work together. Last evening and this morning, we reviewed the documents provided by you yesterday afternoon, and we discussed among ourselves the good exchanges with you yesterday. Based on that example, we would like to propose discussions in three areas this morning and, if necessary, this afternoon. But before I get to the three points, I'd like to call your attention to a particular set of individuals we identified who were associated with interrogations or related activities during the Korean War. It would be very helpful if you would help us identify any of these individuals who are still living whom we can talk to. I know that yesterday morning LTC Osipov mentioned that the pilot of a Soviet aircraft that forced down an F-86 is still in the Moscow area.

"As to the three specific areas we'd like to return to this morning:

"One. We'd like a bit more information about the design bureaus and access they would have had to F-86s brought to Russia and, possibly, to pilots brought to Russia in connection with those aircraft.

"Two. This has to do with procedures for dealing with POWs in Korea, China and, possibly, the Soviet Union. Particularly the question of whether other ministries and agencies of the Soviet Government were bound by the same rules you described as controlling access to U.S. POWs.

"Three. Back to the question of the interrogation reports you made available at our last meeting and during the session yesterday. As LTC Freeman mentioned yesterday, we did research on the archival material and wish to present it to you."

"That's my suggestion on how to proceed today, if it meets with your approval."

Mukhin: "No, no objection at all. We' re prepared to discuss questions that directly affect the armed forces and issues on POWs. As the person responsible for the interrogation research, I'm grateful for help. As we discuss the first two items, I will take notes and contact the pertinent agencies."

Kauzlarich: "I'd like to thank General Volkogonov for his interest in our working group and we're grateful he spent so much time listening in on this important issue."

Volkogonov: "I'd like to say a couple of words. Yesterday, I had no chance. I have a few responses to your report."

"Your version is very interesting. The logic is good and its an interesting historical thesis. So let's consider, logically, what speaks for and against your version."

"For:

"One. The Soviet regime was capable of anything. Oggins was shot two weeks before his scheduled release by Stalin, and Avakumov gave the direct order, as we know, because Avakumov reported it to Stalin. It's clear."

"Two. Definitely, the Soviet side was interested in U.S. technology, as were the Americans about ours. There was keen interests."

"Three. You have concrete examples which can't be rejected outright."

"All of this supports your version.

"What stands against it?"

"One. All of your arguments are just presumptions. There are no concrete facts on the basis of which to make further inquiries."

"Two. We have no documents showing U.S. POWs were taken to the Soviet Union--although I'll give you that many documents exist with indirect evidence of direct interrogations, but not on Soviet territory."

"Three. We have no single eyewitness who served in prison with an American who can specify a name, time and location."

"Four. Under today's policy of *Glasnost,* it would be extremely difficult to conceal such matters. Even archivists would not hide such documents, but would make them public, passing them to us or to the Americans. If such documents existed. There are two telegrams from Stalin--I'll make copies and pass them to you-- they show Stalin absolutely did not want to be associated as a warring party. Kim Il-Sung turned to Stalin with a request for Soviet advisors for every regiment, even for battalions. Stalin categorically refused. Advisors only went to front headquarters and only in extreme need were they sent lower disguised as *Pravda* correspondents."

"The Soviet Union supplied two trawlers to be used for landing parties, but no North Koreans could operate them. They were like spacecraft to them. They requested that 4-5 Soviet personnel stay aboard. Stalin categorically said no. It would have given the U.S. a chance to accuse the Soviet Union. And Stalin gave categorical orders not to cross into South Korea. Stalin wanted an alibi."

"But my conclusion is such: there are too many documents against a refutation, and I could not say that your version is not possible. In the first place, the Soviet regime was capable of anything. So I propose the following steps:"

"I don't believe American POWs were held in any old lager, only in a special lager. Not in 307, but in special camps. Let me explain "special lager." These were for those who got terms of 15-25 years, and they never got reduced sentences for good work or anything. All these camps were in the far north, above the polar circle, very remote, where humans could not survive. They worked ten hour days and correspondence was forbidden. The local authorities had total control--they had a free hand to pass any sentence they felt necessary."

"So I recommend...we know it's true that many of the intelligentsia, writers and so on, died in those camps. So let's ask the Interior Ministry to provide materials."

"I found out a fact that made me think. Stalin died, and a few months later there were uprisings, demanding sentence mitigation, since Stalin was dead and the authorities needed to look again at the cases. The following event happened at the Rechnoy camp in Vorkuta. The inmates didn't go to work, several barracks of them. It was a very serious offense. They demanded to send a petition to Molotov, to Khrushchev. There was a peaceful demonstration outside in the prison square, demanding contact with the administration with their requests. The camp commander ordered the guards to open fire. In a few minutes, about one hundred were dead and hundreds were wounded. I read about this in the Politburo archives--only after 1956 and the 20th CPSU conference were these camps dismantled."

"Why dwell on this? There was never any information on this. The people didn't know--and they're still ignorant. But we must take an interest in it. There are no guarantees, but it's possible there were foreigners in those camps."

"Two. About Camp 307 in Yakutia--we'll check on it and on all other issues raised yesterday. I already gave the orders. We'll try to find the local archives of this camp and we can go there together."

"Three. We'll check with the Ministry of Security and the design bureau records. We'll check who worked there, if anyone might have been an American. We'll review the personnel documents, not the technical ones. We must look at the KGB and design bureaus."

"I'm sorry for this long speech, but I think it's necessary. There's deep interest and a need for clear answers. We need a scientific approach. It's a challenge to our scientific honesty as well as possessing a humanitarian basis."

"We'll look into the personnel archives of the design bureaus and we'll find out which imprisoned scientists might have worked there. You know that Korolev, the famous space researcher, was in one of these '*Sharaskas,'* where the prisoners worked as staff . This is *terra incognita* for us and we must research it."

"In the near future, we'll make official written inquiries- asking for access to the archives for the special camps. Only that will resolve the questions before us. Foreigners would have been sent to special camps."

"The directions you mentioned also help. I'm sorry for my lengthiness."

Kauzlarich: "We welcome this kind of length. Perhaps I can just respond. We undertook serious efforts to lay out the evidence and make our case--not just theoretical, but a real one. And to us there's an important link between the efforts on the part of the Soviets to obtain information on F-86s and pilots still missing in action."

"Because of the incident you described--the F-86 downed on a beach in North Korea--our information tied it to a pilot still not accounted for. And that's why it's so terribly important in our design bureau research to find out the serial numbers of any aircraft brought back from Korea to Russia. Because then you can match missing pilots with a particular aircraft."

"The second point I would make--we believe, based on the evidence available, that there was a strong MGB and GRU role in interviewing POWs. And here we have to depend on interviews with Russian

citizens and others involved with U.S. POWs in Korea. But only you can tell us if other systems were operating that had nothing to do with the Ministry of Defense, and that is why I hoped Mazurov could have been here--perhaps he could shed some light on other systems and help us access archives of the MGB and GRU for this period."

"In our report, we do cite cases of Americans who were POWs and returned to the U.S. who were interrogated directly by the Soviets. Yesterday, we discussed exceptional circumstances. But would other ministries and agencies have been bound by the same rules, or could ethnic Koreans in the Soviet military have had contact with POWs?"

Volkogonov: "An observation--I suggest we discuss this all together. In thirty minutes, General Sosinov will be discussing the Cold War at Old Square. But he was also the commander of the 64th and can't be here. He was an eyewitness to the Mahurin shootdown. He could tell you everything--I'm not sure he'll be asked everything over there. But, if you want, you could meet him some other time in Moscow."

Freeman: "In our report, we state that Colonel Mahurin has no memory of interrogation by Soviets."

Volkogonov: "No, there was no interrogation. He just saw the shootdown and saw him caught.."

Freeman: "But there's a statement by Sosinov that he did interview Mahurin."

Orlov: "I'd like to clarify this. It happened by accident, when Colonel Sosinov, as advisor to the Korean General Staff, was in the area. As General Volkogonov stated, all advisors wore civilian clothes and gave themselves out as *Pravda* correspondents, so he could have asked questions without Mahurin realizing what was going on--and Mahurin spoke Russian, which was important."

Volkogonov: "It was not a traditional interrogation . He might have asked a few questions. Therefore, Mahurin does not believe he was interrogated. I'd like them to meet."

Kauzlarich: "So they're both right. To fill you in--after you left, General Volkogonov, we talked about the rules on contact with U.S. POWs. It was very clear that, in North Korea, there was supposed to be no direct contact. But we get the idea that different rules applied in China. Maybe that's another area for which interrogation reports might have been filled out that would be of interest to us."

"In that connection, I wonder if there was a distinction, I wonder if it was okay to talk to U.S. POWs in Korea under Chinese control?"

"Finally, on the last point, I must say we'd be very grateful for any attempt to get information from the Interior Ministry on the special camps--as our report will indicate, we have fewer specific hard facts on this aspect than on the F-86 pilots. And, as you point out, there's no specific information from our inmate interviews matching specific Americans to specific camps. But it is clear from the information we've received from American officers involved that, at the time of the Korean War, there was a clear belief that POWs were moved to the Soviet Union."

"It is clearly our presumption that, if Americans were brought to the Soviet Union, they were handled in a special way and held in special camps. There, too, we have to depend on you to help us, because we are limited in our information on this very important area.

"But we continue to get reports of these Americans having been in the camp system. As recently as this past weekend, we had a joint interview with a former officer of the MVD who believes he saw an American--Colonel Freeman will pass on some details to help you understand."

Freeman: "Over the weekend, on Saturday, there was a joint interview with representatives from both sides with a retired MVD colonel who stated that, in the early 1960s--1963, I think--he saw a man in a prison at Magadan. This man was walking alone in the exercise yard. The prison warden identified the man to the MVD colonel as an American and said he had been sent to the prison from the camps."

"As you may know, TFR has a "mug" book with photos of missing Americans from the Korean War. This book contains photos of people MIA in Korea, the last photos available and some photos of how they might look when older. When the American and Russian interviewers showed the mug book to the retired MVD colonel, he identified both the youthful and aged photos of a particular American. The photos were of Sgt Phillip Vincent Mandra. He was a Marine Corps infantryman who became missing on the Seventh of August, 1952. Sgt Mandra became missing after a counterattack in which he fought the Chinese. He was not declared a prisoner. I have some details of the circumstances of his disappearance, but not very much is known."

Kauzlarich: "General Volkogonov, I wanted to go into detail to show you how we try to establish facts to the best of our abilities. Unfortunately, the story doesn't go in a straight line. To us it's still pieces of a puzzle--with many pieces remaining to be put in place--but we try to be careful to establish things on a factual basis instead of depending on second-or-third hand reports."

"I guess I only have one last point, and it's very personal for me. I understand how difficult that period of special camp operations was for Soviet citizens and not only for foreigners, and I see that, much as we deal with the families of POWs on our side, similar feelings exist in the Russian families of those who died with no knowledge of their fates. So I think it makes your comments all the more meaningful to the American side."

"LTC Freeman has some additional points on issues relating to design bureaus that could help any search of archives connected with them."

Freeman: "Yesterday, I believe Colonel Mazurov explained that aircraft were indeed taken to the Sukhoi Design Bureau. What is the basis for his statement? Is there a document? Intelligence material related to the statement? Can you provide that?"

Volkogonov: "I only know there was someone from a research institute who said that we had an aircraft. But it disappeared, it was sent elsewhere. It wasn't a written document. We're seeking written evidence."

Freeman: "You can talk to Professor Rushitsky, who confirmed that aircraft were delivered to the central design bureau."

Volkogonov: "If he's alive, of course. If you get us the initials of his first and second name."

Freeman: "It's on page 14. Evgeniy Rushitskiy."

Volkogonov: "From the Zhukovskii Institute, near Moscow?"

Freeman: "Refer to the text. We had 'Zhukovskii.'"

Orlov: "Zhukovskii--it's a military airfield near Moscow."

Freeman: "There's also a statement from a designer who remembers the disassembly of the sand-filled F-86. He also remembers that there was an American pilot available at another location for questioning."

Orlov: "Near Moscow?"

Freeman: "It just says 'elsewhere. '; And other designers remember it as well. The information on page 15 indicates there was more than one aircraft, two or three of them. And these aircraft were captured in Korea--or China--and brought back from the theater to Moscow. As you have pointed out, at least one F-86 was forced down on a beach. We have this information from General Lobov, from a retired KGB officer, and from designers from Sukhoi and Mig."

"While I admit we have no concrete information on the presence of pilots, these people who know about the F-86s knew about pilots--and it's logical that pilots would be available with the aircraft. The

information about the aircraft is true. Also, we believe we have a number of candidates for who those pilots might have been."

Volkogonov: "Excuse me. " [Leaves]

Freeman: "I explained yesterday that we've carefully analyzed the interrogation materials you provided to us. We have a short version of our analysis in this paper, in the Korea document you received yesterday, on pages 5, 6, 7 mainly. And I'm going to give you more detailed information, as well."

Mukhin: "Taking into account what we gave you yesterday?"

Freeman: "No."

Mukhin: "Would this eliminate something?"

Freeman: "No. The information you gave us yesterday does not help us determine whether people are dead or returned to our control. These documents are duplicates. There are no new names.

Mukhin: "So yesterday's copies can be regarded as confirmation of the list we gave you last time--and last time you asked us to confirm names with copies of documents. That's what we gave you yesterday. In our view, this is new material."

Freeman: "We've checked and we already have the interrogations on these same people."

Mukhin: "Reports of interrogation, or just lists?"

Freeman: "No, actual interrogations. We can't exclude the possibility of new material, but the documents refer to people we already know about. It may be supplementary."

Mukhin: "Remember the history of our commission. First, we gave you the list, then the interrogations at your request. Why didn't we give you the interrogations immediately? Because, on our side, we feared repressive measures against your pilots. But Ambassador Toon repeatedly assured us it wouldn't ruin reputations, that nothing bad would happen. So General Volkogonov said, 'All right, give them all of the documents.

Freeman: "For your information, we protect the confidentiality of all personnel documents, so nothing can harm the people discussed in the documents."

Mukhin: "Yes, well, we 'whispered' because we didn't want a repeat of our experience when our POWs returned home to worse punishment than under the Germans."

Kauzlarich: "Our interest is not to criticize the pilots. Our interest is in those on whom there's no information yet. That's our universe here."

Freeman: "In late summer, 1992, you provided us with two lists of U.S. POWs you said were provided by the Chinese and North Koreans...one list had 59 names, the other 71 names. 42 names appeared on both lists, in an almost identical sequence. At the request of the American side, you provided us with interrogation files associated with the two lists--however, these files are only on 46 individuals. By reviewing archival data written on the files, we were able to determine that 120 pages are missing. In those cases, when interrogation materials are missing, another--"

Mukhin: "Give us the concrete names and files you need. Colonel Brilov is Chief of the Central Archives--he already sees the task that needs to be carried out. Neither you nor we had specifics back then. Speaking about pages, I foresee a question--maybe in the interrogation files, the first page had demographic data. Then

there's the standard question about cover pages. We need names..."

Freeman: "Fine. Let me go to that. When we analyzed the information further, we came to believe that 120 pages are missing, with information on 8 POWs. A ninth MIA was not on your lists, but showed up in the interrogation files. But he was not on the list. We can give you archival citations and page numbers."

Mukhin: "That would be good. And what kind of information do you need from them?"

Freeman: "Just the missing 120 pages. We're not talking about pages from interrogation reports you've already given us--these are separate reports you have not given us.

Mukhin: "...Pages, files...fine."

Freeman: "We will give you the names again. They're on page 7 [of the Korea document]."

Mukhin: "First, give us the files and pages. Second, give us family names."

Freeman: "We owe you page numbers and file citations. I'll give you my copy of this document."

Mukhin: "What information do you need on these men?"

Freeman: "The interrogation reports on the eight men from both lists."

Freeman: "The same as the rest."

Mukhin: "But maybe we gave it to you yesterday?"

Kauzlarich: "No."

Brilov: "I can't be absolutely sure, I'll check name by name. There are two possibilities--that our archivists missed them, or that they don't exist."

Peters: "Your files are so perfectly organized that's it's clear these interrogation reports exist. Perhaps they were removed."

[Peters and Mukhin have an exchange in Russian. Mukhin expresses reservations about the existence of the reports and Peters lays out why, according to the Russians' filing system, the reports must either exist or existed in the past.]

Mukhin: "With the assistance of our archivists, we will solve this. If there's nothing further for Professor Orlov, he's given us a great deal of time already..."

[Peters raises the Korotkov interrogations of U.S. POWs in an "ill- defined area" that could have been Soviet territory, and Korotkov's admission that he wore a Soviet uniform during these contacts--yet no U.S. returnees recall such an incident. What became of these Americans who were clearly held within the Soviet system, at least provisionally?]

Mukhin: "On behalf of the Ministry of Defense, I can say that documents on Korotkov's contacts don't exist in our archives to support Korotkov's statements. Perhaps this relates to the circumstances raised yesterday by Professor Orlov--it didn't involve individuals, just information, and so records weren't kept. Second, I don't think those people could simply disappear. I'll repeat what I said yesterday--and General Volkogonov repeated it-- at the highest level, Stalin, this was forbidden. The ban on such contacts was further strengthened by the General Staff. But what Orlov described yesterday, that was a violation of orders. Such a violation went contrary to orders, thus there-is no documentation."

Krayushkin: "If you don't mind, I'd like to give my observations. We worked from the Commission's beginning puzzling each other with questions as to whether the Soviet security services and GRU were interested in American POWs. I believe we must answer this question in relation to the previous leadership and how it related to Korea and Vietnam. Relations were such that the situation did not allow us to dictate to the Vietnamese or-Koreans. Therefore, we had to question POWs through the Chinese or Korean interrogators. Maybe there were some exceptions, some few interrogations of U.S. POWs by Soviet officers. In my work with the intelligence and counterintelligence people who served in Vietnam, I asked this question. And they would not have lied to a KGB general, as I used to be. You know they didn't conceal anything. And they were unanimous--there was no contact with American prisoners. The Vietnamese and Korean authorities forbid contact with U.S. POWs. In fact, the issue of the transport of POWs to the territory of the Soviet Union was not even raised. And if you talked to your intelligence people, they would confirm that your POWs were of no interest to our intelligence services for future use."

"We're practical people and we stand not on suppositions but on facts. And there is no proof, not one fact supporting your notion that POWs were taken to the Soviet Union. We've approached this problem as best we could and we're ready to help you check all information. On that count, we'll investigate the MVD camp issue and Orlov's issues. But your colleagues visited an MVD camp last time and found nothing but criminals were held there. They worked through the administration and service files, and there was nothing. But let me underline our readiness to verify and reverify this."

Kauzlarich: "Let me respond first. Before you came, we had extensive discussions on this issue with General Volkogonov present. We do have facts, and we presented them in the documentation presented yesterday. They come from Russian citizens and American citizens indicating that Americans were transported to the Soviet Union at the time of the Korean War. And this was clearly a concern of U.S. intelligence, that POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. This is not something we created in 1993. One thing concerns us--since, as you point, out, we can't match names with sightings. This is due to the fact they were held in special camps for Americans or foreigners. General Volkogonov offered to look into that. The second possibility is that identifications and names were changed so individuals were not carried on the camp records as the people we're looking for.

"This past weekend, a retired MVD colonel said he saw an American who had been given a number instead of a name."

"These are our facts. Some are precise, some less precise."

Krayushkin: "But we can find counter arguments. First, we can't categorically assess data obtained from U.S. intelligence. I believe there were more suppositions than real data. As far as Americans in camps in the Soviet Union, if they were kept, we can't exclude the possibility that they're still kept. In that vein, consider that U.S. and Russian Commissioners went on television and into the press with their appeals for information, announcing our quest to all the population of Russia and asking them to report such cases."

"At the same time, we have to ask this question: What is the sense of continuing to confine Americans in Russia against their will? I fully understand and respect your thoroughness, and we try to match it. We have repeatedly stressed our readiness to offer any assistance we can, and my comments are not a sign of closing off the discussion. But this is my approach to viewing the situation more clearly."

"We have to stress once more that the archives of the security services have been searched and we have not found one document supporting your beliefs. I'm responsible for our archives, and we have been thorough. There is no indication of a plan or operation to transport POWs. There is only one case--the transfer of four U.S. deserters from Vietnam who were delivered to Moscow by way of Japan. They were used for propaganda purposes then handed over to the Swedes."

Kauzlarich: "We handed over a list of your personnel from the Ministry of Defense and the security services who might help us on the Korean War or other wars. It would be very helpful if you would review those lists and tell us if the individuals are still alive and if they would talk to us.

Krayushkin: "Good."

Kauzlarich: "This is as helpful as document searches in the archives. In the Korean War case, it's been even more helpful. But I take your point about live Americans in prison today in Russia. But there's another alternative--that these individuals died in captivity, due to sickness or the regime of the camps. If they were imprisoned under other identities, their names would not show up. Only you can answer the question whether foreign prisoners were held under different identities. We have to depend on what others tell us--and former Soviet officials have said this happened. So here we have to trust you."

Krayushkin: "Of course, in the USA there is a precedent where prisoners are held under different identities for political reasons. This calls for an examination. We'll work on it.

Kauzlarich: "I don't believe Americans were ever held under false identities in the United States."

Krayushkin: "Let's not go into specific details."

Orlov: "Regarding Soviet contact with American POWs in Korea--the Ministry of Defense had strong orders forbidding it. As General Volkogonov says, these were top-level orders, from Stalin, and I think this order was valid for the other ministries, as well. But there may have been cases where they broke the rule. I described one when I needed urgent information from U.S. fliers and then when our journalist interviewed LTC Black. In those cases, and under the circumstances of those times, well, such cases may have been numerous. As General Sosinov told the Commission, there were also accidental cases. And the corps commander, Lobov, says in his memoirs that he met American POWs in the Sam i-Ju Camp [as heard] and had direct contact with them. So this- happened, there were exceptions. But remember--these contacts happened on Korean soil and Soviet citizens couldn't wear uniforms. And not only no uniforms--they didn't even have their personal documents."

"Now, this is the context. As to the F-86 aircraft allegedly brought to Moscow, and as to pilots, the two recollections from participants in the two cases connected with those F-86s sound as though those two cases might really be two descriptions of one case.

"Colonel Popelayev--the first F-86 was brought down by him and it landed near the coast of the Yellow Sea, but the pilot was rescued by the Americans. The plane was transported by the North Koreans to a hidden tunnel, then transported disassembled to the Soviet Union."

"In the second case, the pilot Abakumov told the same things; the pilot was alive and he was rescued by the Americans, but the plane was bombed to splinters during its transportation to the tunnel."

"This evidence is from 1951. Perhaps later there were other sources, but I know nothing of them."

"Now to the question LTC Freeman raised yesterday--he was interested in the form in which we documented interviews. Unfortunately, no such documents were found, perhaps because they were not in compliance with formal interrogation requirements. I don't quite remember how we organized it."

Freeman: (hands over a document) "Is this an informal interrogation?"

Orlov: "No. This is formal, with questions addressed to a particular person. We were interested only in rank, specialty, position, maybe age. Perhaps we did it in the same way, but, fundamentally, we were interested in technical data."

Freeman: (hands over another paper) "What kind of interrogation was this?"

Orlov: "When our colleagues gave us the interrogation materials, they didn't give notes, but processed finished reports. When I look at this, I'll tell you we didn't need such detail. Maybe the North Koreans did that and passed the data to our advisors. The American party really exaggerates our influence over the Koreans and Vietnamese. They took their own decisions, sometimes contrary to our advisors."

Mukhin: "As Kiplinq said, 'East is East and West is West...'"

Freeman: "Let me bring up the case of Dearmond, a retired Air Force brigadier general. He was a lieutenant when he was shot down in Korea and he was imprisoned in North Korea--and he was interrogated by English-speaking Koreans in uniform under the supervision of a Soviet officer. Dearmond was certain that the supervisor was Soviet. He was Caucasian, burly, heavy-set, with a round face and blue eyes.

Orlov: "But how did he know he was Soviet? In northern China, there were lots of Russian immigrants..."

Freeman: "He spoke Russian and wore a different uniform, a tunic with blue slacks."

Orlov: "That could have been a Chinese uniform. "

Freeman: "He directed the interrogation without interfering. Answers were passed to the Soviet on paper in a language Dearmond didn't understand."

Orlov: "Certainly, he was a representative of our Army. But how could he be so sure he was Soviet? Anyway, it was a violation."

Freeman: "Dearmond says the Soviet sat in another room most of the time and that the Koreans identified the Soviet as an advisor. Also, other statements from Dearmond say that the Koreans implied several times that the man was a Soviet."

Orlov: "Yes, one of ours. But he was violating the rules. "

Kauzlarich: "This is why we believe there might be additional information in your files."

Freeman: "Our point here it that the Koreans were under Soviet supervision."

[Peters made a series of points on Korean-Soviet relations at the time of the Korean War, stressing how they were clearly more advantageous to the Soviets than were later relations between the Soviets and the Vietnamese, since the Koreans were heavily dependent upon the Soviets, while the Vietnamese could behave much more independently.]

Orlov: "That's true."

Krayushkin: "I only speak from my own experience--but you can't change the essence of the facts. Even if I'm too young to have served in Korea, my preparations stand me in good stead."

Orlov: "Of course, Soviet-Korean relations were different then they are today. All of the Korean leaders were from the Soviet Union and spoke Russian. It was easy for our advisors to work with them. But don't forget the Chinese factor--the Chinese later called the shots and Soviet-Chinese relations were not so unclouded. As for the role of the Soviet- Union. it's in our archives: Kim Il-Sung started the war and he and Mao persuaded Stalin."

Mukhin: "Then they pressed the Soviet Union for materiel."

Orlov: "Stalin agreed, on condition that they conquer South Korea before the U.S. could get into the war. When the Americans moved The Chinese decided to bring in offer air cover. Still. Stalin north, it was a big problem. troops, if the Soviets would restricted the air cover to power plants and the bridges over the Yalu. As the war continued, Stalin really feared a direct conflict with the Americans."

Mukhin: "We said today, Stalin said, 'Help, but don't participate.' There was the ban on direct contact with Americans, the different uniforms, different identification markings on our planes..."

Orlov: "A mass transportation of POWs would have been interpreted as an act of war."

Freeman: "Mass, yes. But let's focus on a few people who had a good chance of being taken to the Soviet Union."

Orlov: "I raised the issue of mass transport because in your paper a Chinese is mentioned who claimed that two trainloads of 480 persons each were sent to the Soviet Union."

Peters: "We share all evidence, we're being completely open with you."

Orlov: "And that's absolutely correct."

Peters: "We know you can sort out that which is credible."

Krayushkin: "Yes, together."

Freeman: "Can I provide you with an example of a specific archival reference? This is for McDonough, Unruh and Bergman. McDonough Bergman was a B-29 was an RB-45C pilot. Unruh was a B-26 pilot. radar operator. I will recite the archival references. In the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, they're in fond 64IAP, inventory 174045SS, File 143, pages 269 to 285. The archival references for the other six people we discussed can be found on this diagram. You can have this. You should be able to find information on nine missing Americans by referring to the archival references "

Mukhin: "Agreed."

Freeman: "Can we have copies of the originals, please?"

Peters: "Of these specific pages.

Kauzlarich: "They should be exactly like the others you provided."

Brilov: "What if the information on those pages has nothing to do with these men?"

Freeman: "We have confidence in the logic of your system. The information will be on those pages."

Mukhin: "Fine. We'll look and see. We'll try to get it done as soon as possible. You've flown across the ocean to do work, not just to see us.

Kauzlarich: "But to do that, as well."

Mukhin: (refers to document handed over by U.S. side) "Is this a question mark instead of a number?"

[U.S. Air Force Master Sergeant Danz Blasser explained the document and how to use it.]

Kauzlarich: "One point from yesterday I thought you might want to look at in terms of the security service archives--Major Amirov, a contemporary military journalist, stated that the MGB issued a directive in 1952 through the Ministry of Defense to capture F-86 pilots for interrogation. This is a factual question--is this based on any archival material in your possession?"

Krayushkin: "I haven't read this material. We'll look and see, but I suspect it had to do with technology, not pilots. And if it passed through the Ministry of Defense, it wouldn't be in my archives."

Mukhin: "For my part, Major Amirov could have said the Ministry of Defense decided to capture the atomic bomb..."

Krayushkin: "Lately, our journalists have learned a lot from the West. They've become irresponsible,

seeking sensations."

Freeman: "Why not bring Amirov here?"

Peters: "He's in the Yekaterinburg area.

Freeman: "Colonel Parr tried to bring him here."

Krayushkin: "We've often seen that words are only words until they're proven. You can't always believe words. Memories fail, there are time gaps. We have to look for documentary sources. Nothing happened in the Soviet Union without the approval of the highest authorities. People didn't take the initiative. Therefore, there would be documentation. We can use oral evidence, but we should use it to find documents.

"It would have been a nightmare for our old leaders to see this--they never dreamed we, along with the U.S., would be questioning their decisions."

Kauzlarich: "This is a good place to break. We've given you all we had. Now we'll give you time to respond."

Mukhin: "I suggest we finish today's work. You've given us quite enough material to work on. We'll try to provide an answer as soon as possible--but not today. Tomorrow. Besides, after lunch I must take part in the work of the Cold War Group."

Freeman: "You passed a document to us yesterday--it went to the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Air Force. It mentions people we're interested in--Kiba, Voorhees. Kiba is alive and says Voorhees was alive. Perhaps you could take down references and provide them to us?"

Mukhin: "We'll tell our archivists that this document and those names are of particular interest. We'll ask them to look especially hard."

Freeman: "As a rule, when there are references, we'd like to see them."

Kauzlarich: "Tomorrow, I assume we will report on the work of our group--the two of us, jointly. Is that your understanding?"

Mukhin: "Yes, I suppose."

Kauzlarich: "How should we characterize our work of the past two days?"

Mukhin: "Briefly, the results of our work...it became clear on our part which direction our work on interrogation reports should take. Above all, we'll work on those eight pilots on the list you gave us and, second, we'll work on those pages you just gave us. We'll talk about this in terms of tasks. "

"On general results, it seems to me we have reached an understanding on the following issues:"

"On the design bureaus, General Volkogonov will confirm it. He said he'd write an official request."

"Also, we'll look into the research institutes for aviation, such as Ilyushin and others."

"Of course, we've clarified a lot of problems on POWs. Our work is better-focused now. That's my understanding."

Kauzlarich: "I would only add General Volkogonov' s decision to look into the special camp system to see if it yields any information on Americans. For our part, you asked about specific incidents, an attack on your aircraft and an attack on your airfield."

Mukhin: "Not airfield, but an attempt to violate borders."

Kauzlarich: "No, Orlov said it."

Mukhin: "All right. I was talking about the four MiGs taking off, when only two returned."

Kauzlarich: "We'll do our best, and we'll look over the information you gave us yesterday and we may have further comments through our people in Moscow. Also, General Volkogonov said he would provide two cables between Stalin and Kim Il-Sung and the orders not to get involved in the war."

Mukhin: "Yes. Stalin didn't want to get involved. We sent in advisors disguised as *Pravda* reporters, then there was that business about the trawlers...Dmitrii Antonovich should have them for you.

Kauzlarich: "It only remains for me to thank you for your hard work. This really is a joint effort and we want to keep that spirit."

Mukhin: "Thank you. All I want to say is that, over the last two days, we talked frankly and openly and have conducted a small study in the field of history. We learned from you, you might have learned from us on military history of our two countries. It really was a pleasure for me to talk to the Co-Chairman and members of the working group, and I hope we were able to answer some questions and that we covered some gaps in history. Many thanks again for the friendly discussions and relations."

[Session ends.]

ANNEX C to JCSB Triweekly Report for the period 26 AUGUST to 10 SEPTEMBER 1993

Subject: Results of the Cold War Working Group of the U.S./Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA

As part of the sixth Commission meeting, the Cold War Working Group convened at 10 AM on 1 September 1993 in the offices of Gen. Volkogonov at Il'yinka 12, Moscow.

The American working group chair was A. Denis Clift, Chief of Staff of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The chairman of the Russian side was LTC Sergei N. Osipov. Also attending the session for the U.S. side were COL Jerry Parr, MAJ William Burkett, LT John Joyce, and SSG Henry Eastman. LTC Dmitri Tihomirov served as interpreter. Additional Russian representatives present were BG Krayushkin (Ministry of Security), COL Zaporoshchenko, and Messrs. Biryukov and Sokolyov.

LTC Osipov began by proposing the agenda, which was to go over the documents that the Russian side had found in their archives, then to give the floor to the American side to make its presentation. Mr. Clift agreed.

Mr. Clift then introduced the American team, and tabled a request from Ambassador Toon. Yesterday, Clift said, Gen. Volkogonov had addressed the subject of World War II POWs. Ambassador Toon said that it would be helpful to receive a written statement reflecting that discussion, to include the number of U.S. prisoners that were interned, the number released, and where people remained. LTC Osipov said that he would pass on the request to Gen. Volkogonov.

LTC Osipov said that the Russian side was concerned not only with U.S. losses in the Cold War, but also Russian losses as well. This must be a 2-way street. Today, two Russians would appear before the working group: Gen. Sozinov, who commanded the unit which had shot down the C- 130 over Armenia in 1958, and Gen. Pepelyayev, a Soviet pilot in the Korean War. Now to our questions. Osipov pointed to a green folder, and said that in the folder were declassified documents on 11 incidents that they would give us at the closing plenary on 2 September. These documents had been discovered in three archives: the Ministry of Defense archives in Podol'sk, the Ministry of Security archives, and the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Russian side, he continued, had done more research in five archives: the above three, plus the archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU), and the Politburo archives. Osipov indicated that some documents, in a red folder, had yet to be declassified, but would be submitted to the General Staff soon for declassification.

Osipov then started to speak about the documents the Russian side had found. He emphasized that there was no new information regarding U.S. POWs on Soviet soil. He then proceeded to review the documents for each specific case.

The shootdown over the Baltic Sea on 8 April 1950 was the first incident discussed. Osipov said that a whole series of documents from December, 1949, indicated that Soviet airspace had been violated many times by U.S. aircraft, and that people had been reprimanded for allowing these violations to occur. At that time, no Soviet aircraft or bases had radar devices. On 7 March 1950, the decision was taken to transfer special planes to Palanga (Lithuania). More violations ensued, and documents reported fully on these incidents. Osipov said that we would receive these documents in 2-7 days. On 8 April 1950, a plane was sighted 35 km north of Liepaya, Latvia, moving to the south. Four Soviet planes were scrambled. The American plane was intercepted at 1740 hours at 3000 meters. A Soviet interceptor waggled its wings and requested the U.S. plane to leave Soviet airspace. At 2500 meters, the Soviet pilots received orders, and shot down the plane. After the incident, Osipov added, there was an extensive search effort which went on for three months, and over 200 attempts were made to find the plane. But, he said, there were mines in the area, and they found no parts, no bodies, only 10 oxygen bottles. And there was no exact tie to the aircraft in question. Osipov said that they would pass us a new document from the Chief of the General Staff and the Air Force commander to Stalin.

Osipov then turned to a shootdown on 26 December 1950, which he called a Korea case. The Russian side has one document, an Air Force report, which indicates that on that date at 1415, 2 MIG-15s had a short battle with a B-29. The B-29 opened fire, the MIGs returned fire, and smoke came from the right wing of the B-29. Due to cloudy conditions, the pilots couldn't see what happened to the plane. The U.S. side indicated that this was not one of our 10 open Cold War shootdown cases, but that the document may be helpful to our Korean War analysts.

Turning to his next case, Osipov said that he had new documents on the 6 November 1951 shootdown in the Sea of Japan. These included a map of the air battle, which shows the crash site as close to but slightly east of Cape Ostrovnoi. There is a report to the Chief of the General Staff and the Politburo. He said that the plane burned, and there were no parachutes. The incident was viewed by an observation point at Cape Ostrovnoi. The documents include an eyewitness list. Other documents say that there was a report made in Navy channels from the 5th Pacific Fleet to Admiral Kuznetsov in Moscow, as well as reports to Stalin and to the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Osipov said that at 1019, the plane was seen burning in the sea by two aircraft crews, who photographed a burning oil slick. Within four hours of the crash, and until 1600 local time, three Soviet cutters went to the crash area, but found nothing. At 1520, the U.S. search started.

On the 13 June 1952 shootdown, Osipov said that there had been a report filed immediately from the 5th Fleet counterintelligence unit, and,"the counterintelligence people would be interested in finding people and that is why we checked this archive." Other documents show that two Navy MIG-15s intercepted the U.S. plane at 1733 local time. The U.S. plane opened fire, the MIGs returned fire. One of the Russian planes was damaged, and almost didn't make it back. There is a map of the incident, and a follow-up report was filed the next day. There was no data on people, and within one day, the U.S. was in the area. There are also photos of the crash site, and an Air Army investigation report, as well as a report from ADM Kuznetsov to Stalin.

On the 7 October 1952 shootdown, documents indicate the following: there is a flight map and reports from observation posts which cover the time 1431-1530 local. The plane was shot down, and Border Troops saw the plane go down. A search was conducted by the 114th Border Guard Detachment. There is a report on this from the Commander, Far East Military District, Gen. Zhdanov. At 1535 local, the 360th observation post saw the incident 3 km SE of Yuri Island. There were two explosions, and the search cutters found, in addition to debris from the plane, a headless corpse. The American side interjected that this was the body of Capt. John R. Dunham, and asked what had been done with the body. BG Krayushkin replied that he believes that the body was thrown back overboard and had "never been in

Soviet hands." When U.S. representatives expressed incredulity at this view, Krayushkin replied, "Remember that at the time we were killing our own citizens and putting them into camps. Do you think we cared about a single American body?"

(20 minute break)

After the break, LTC Osipov started by talking about some of the documents relating to the 2 September 1958 shootdown over Armenia of a C-130. He referenced a document from Konev and Ivashutin to the Central Committee, CPSU, and the Foreign Ministry regarding the transfer of bodies to the American side. With that, he introduced Gen. Sozinov, who in 1958 was the commander of a separate Air Defense Regiment in the Transcaucasus Military District. Sozinov said that his signals intelligence assets picked up the C-130. The plane, rather than flying in a straight line, "painted the border," a daily flight from Turkey down to the Iranian border, then turned around and flew the same route back, never penetrating the border. However, around Leninakan the border bulges west, and the C-130 cut across the bulge. Two pairs of MIG-17s went up to challenge the plane, and attacked it at the very beginning of the penetration. The pilot of the first plane in the first flight of two fired two warning shots to try to get the plane to leave Soviet territory. The second pilot, following, reported that the C-130 didn't respond and continued more deeply into the USSR. The second pilot was told to attack. In the 3rd or 4th minute after intercept, the first pair of MIGs opened machine-gun fire. Smoke came from the C-130. It continued to fly level while descending. After an interval of 20-30 seconds, the second pair of MIGs attacked the C-130. As a result of the second attack, the tail section broke off, and the plane dove sharply into the ground, near a Soviet radar unit on the mountainside. Sozinov said that he himself was there within 2-2 1/2 hours of the crash. He discovered that the plane had exploded upon impact. There was a hot fire, and the means to fight the fire were limited in a remote region. The plane was strewn over an area about 250-300 meters across. The tail section was about 400 meters to the side. The fire burned into the morning of 3 September, so it wasn't until the 3rd that they started to dig. Human remains, he said, are tough. Two bodies had been thrown away from the plane, so they were less burned. Seven bodies were given back. The weather that day was clear, and there were a lot of people at the site. Nobody said anything about parachutes. Sozinov said that he talked to the commander of the radar site, and the commander told him that no one in the unit had seen parachutes. Sozinov believes that there were no survivors.

Mr. Clift asked about the possibility of survivors. Sozinov repeated his statement. Clift then asked about persistent rumors that a woman's shoe was found in the wreckage. Sozinov replied, "I was a young man then. I would have remembered that." Clift asked where the plane was taken. Sozinov said that it was turned over to the American side. COL Parr then showed Sozinov a drawing of the crash site, which indicated that the wreckage was only scattered to a diameter of 35-40 meters. Sozinov dismissed that contention, and repeated his earlier 250-300 meters estimate. Gun camera photos were then passed around, and a discussion ensued as to whether a dial seen on the photos was a clock or an altimeter. The conclusion was that it was an altimeter. LT Joyce then asked about the disposition of the tail section, and queried whether there would be written record of this. LTC Osipov said he thought there would have been. Osipov also commented that the Russians thought that there were only 6 or 7 on a C-130 crew, so once they found that many bodies, they stopped looking. Gen. Sozinov said that his higher headquarters was concerned that the tail section was on the Soviet side of the border. When the U.S. released the transcript of the pilots' conversations, the Russians denied the incident.

Osipov said that the Russians had done all they could do. Clift asked if the U.S. side could get into Podol'sk to do further research. Osipov replied," Full copies of all documents there have been passed to the American side. The only exception is the photos and you have them now. There is nothing left to see there. Foreign researchers are not allowed at Podol'sk. All of these files are intermingled with other classified operational files of that period. Our commission has a humanitarian mission. Our agreement was for one-time access only." Clift asked if the Russian side had interviewed the pilots, as they would be the best eyewitnesses. Osipov replied that they had not done so, but would try. Clift then asked about a 1961 article in the Soviet magazine "Ogonyek," which had mentioned parachutes. Osipov said that the editor had been fired as a result of that article. Clift asked whether the Russians had contacted the author, W. Schreyer. Osipov replied in the negative. The U.S. side then thanked Gen. Sozinov for his participation, and he left.

LTC Osipov then went over an incident on 23 June 1955 off Provedeniya. Radar picked up a P2V Neptune plane. Two MIGs were scrambled, attacked the plane, and the intruder went into the clouds. The document reports the coordinates of the incident.

The Working Group then broke for lunch.

The two sides reconvened at 1430. Attendees were the same, with the addition on the Russian side of Professor Orlov, and the return of BG Krayushkin, who had left after the morning break.

The Russian side continued their review of documents on each of the Cold War incidents. On the 29 July 1953 shootdown of an RB-50 in the Sea of Japan, a new document from Gen. Nevzorov, Commander of the Far East Air Army, says that at 0550 local time an intruder aircraft was spotted 56 nautical miles off Cape Gamov, and violated the border at 0600 13 km south of Gamov and southwest of Askold Island. Two fighters attacked the plane at 10000 meters at 0611 7-8 miles off Askold Island. The intruder fired back and damaged one Soviet fighter, then crashed 15 km south of Askold Island.

Osipov then turned to a 7 November 1954 incident, and noted that all U.S. servicemembers had been recovered. The American side agreed, and noted that that incident was not on our list.

The 18 April 1955 incident was next, and the Russian side reported that Gen. Sokolovski of the Ministry of Defense told the CPSU Central Committee the exact location of the shootdown near Medni Island, and that Capt. Rubtsov was the pilot who shot the plane down. There were also reports to the Central Committee from both Marshal Zhukov and Molotov. At 1115 local, Russian fishermen saw smoke and fire from the plane. Osipov then said that the incident had been hushed up by the Russian government.

On the 1 July 1960 incident, Osipov said that their documents showed that the Soviet pilot had opened fire without orders from the ground, after the Soviets had tracked the plane from 2045-0615. There also was a document from Malinovsky and Berezov to the Central Committee. Fishing boats picked up the two fliers who were given back. Osipov said that the Soviets were more interested in the equipment on board than in the people. He noted that Palm's remains were found and returned. Clift asked as to the whereabouts of the body of Major Posa. The Russian side had no answer.

Osipov said that, on the 14 December 1965 loss of an RB-57 over the Black Sea, the Russian document showed that they found aircraft parts in the Black Sea as a result of a search. As Osipov tried to find the document, he gave the floor to Professor Orlov.

Professor Orlov then commented about the C-130 incident. He said that the attack had occurred at an altitude of 10000 meters over about 2 minutes. This, he said, created an opportunity for the crew to jump. Orlov stated that from his research, at 1507 the MIG aircraft approached the C-130. At 1510, the first attack was made, and at 1512, the C-130 crashed. It was a 2-minute attack, during which the tail was severed. Orlov believes that people who say they saw parachutes are confusing this incident with a C-118 that had been forced down 9 weeks earlier in the same region from which Americans did bail out. In that incident, all 9 Americans were given back. Why, Orlov asked rhetorically, were they given back in June and in September the incident was denied? He opined that the political situation between the two countries had worsened markedly in the intervening time. Orlov mentioned the revolution in Iraq, the U.S. intervention in Lebanon, the British intervention in Sudan. The USSR had been acting as a "peacemaker," so there was a contradiction in shooting down an unarmed plane. So the Soviets didn't announce the incident. Orlov said it was the same in the 1960 incident - they didn't want to help Nixon. Clift noted that Orlov said the attack took two minutes, whereas Gen. Sozinov said the attack lasted 20-30 seconds. Orlov was taken aback, and retreated from the precision of his two-minute estimate. He continued to back away from the two-minute figure in comments made on the fringes of the plenary on 2 September.

Osipov returned to the 14 December 1965 incident. He stated that all information the Russian side had came from their radio intercepts, which indicated that the plane fell from the sky at 1554 local time, 210 kilometers southwest of Yalta and disappeared. Soviet ships found a wing of the plane. With that, LTC

Osipov concluded the presentation of the Russian side.

Mr. Clift opened his presentation by thanking the Russian side for their research and cooperation. He went on to say that the information the Russian side had discovered did much to confirm much of the analysis by the U.S. side. He noted that in every case, the shootdown of an American plane was not a routine event, but rather an occurrence which called forth immediate message traffic from the field to the highest authorities in Moscow. LTC Osipov's statements also confirm, Clift said, that searches were carried out routinely as a result of these shootdowns, and that some, if not most, of the searches would have been carried out by the Border Guard Troops. Osipov interjected that the Border Guards had no capability to go out farther than 6 miles from shore, and that they would have had only two cutters, and would have used ships of the Navy to help with the search. He said that if Americans had been taken as a result of these searches, the evidence would be in the security files of the GRU. Clift then asked if we could get the logs of search vessels. Osipov replied that these would be in Gatchina. Clift then asked for the Soviet Air Forces "Bulletin of Lessons Learned." Osipov agreed to try to get this document for the U.S. side. Clift expressed the U.S. belief that there would be a high level of KGB interest in these incidents, as evidenced by the cordoning off of sections of Riga in 1950. This goes back to the KGB.

Gen. Krayushkin then talked about the counterintelligence atmosphere in the Baltics during the late 40's/early 50's. He said that it was well known that in the years after WWII, American and British secret services were illegally running agents into the USSR through the Baltics. The agents used by the US/UK were captured Soviet soldiers whom they recruited and brought in by sea from subs and cutters and planes. The KGB tried to prevent this. This explains why areas of Riga were cordoned off. Osipov commented that they have information on this from Resnikov.

Krayushkin said that, on the C-130 case, when considering the role of the KGB, that it was a different organization, with different reporting channels. The KGB personnel were just trying to keep their bosses informed. They had no interest in pilots for future exploitation. There would have been more interest, he said, on the part of the GRU for U.S. pilots for their technical capabilities, qualifications, etc. Osipov said that the GRU had no answers, and that this view had already been expressed by Gen. Ladygin. Three months ago, Osipov said, Yeltsin had instructed the security services to turn over all their documents on American POWs. The security services say they have done so.

Gen. Krayushkin said that as regards the security archives, "We've turned over all our documents, regardless of content. Not once did I think I was being stonewalled. I can look you in the eye and tell you: we've given all our documents." The U.S. side expressed its skepticism regarding the general's assertion.

Mr. Clift then moved to the 6 November 1951 shootdown, and asked for the logs of all units involved in the search. Osipov replied that the Russian side would provide us with a list of possible eyewitnesses.

Clift asked for all debriefings and logs from Navy, Air Defense, and Border Guard units involved in the 13 June 1952 incident in the Sea of Japan. Osipov replied that the Russian side would pass these documents. Clift asked about the possibility of gun camera footage on this shootdown. Osipov said that they had looked in the Ministry of Defense files and that none was found. A discussion ensued among the Russians on the subject of gun camera footage. It was decided that the only footage they had were on 2 September 1958 and 7 November 1954. Any other footage was likely destroyed, but they would check.

The question Clift asked on the 7 October 1952 incident concerned the disposition of the body of Capt. John R. Dunham. Krayushkin replied that he had personally looked into the issue of the search for bodies, and he believes that in this case they returned the body to the sea. He said that they had asked everyone involved with the case about this (NFI), and that there was no good answer.

Turning to the 29 July 1953 case, Clift asked for all the information that American researchers had already seen at Gatchina, as well as pilot debriefings and logs of the cutters that conducted the search. Osipov said that the Russian side had tried to find the trawler crew, but couldn't. And, he said, the alleged eyewitness Kravchenko did not serve on Russkii Island at that time.

On the 18 April 1955 incident, Clift asked for the logs of the search/Border Guard units involved, and the pilot debriefs. Osipov said that there were no reports from ground control, only the logs of the Air Defense unit. COL Zaporoshchenko, head of the Border Guard archives, made the point that each border post had a daily log, but due to the sheer volume, these were destroyed after five years. Clift then said that if the daily logs on all ten incidents would have been destroyed, then were there any yearly summaries. Zaporoshchenko replied maybe, maybe not. Clift requested another check of the archives on this point. Osipov said that they had found a crew list of the fishing boat that had seen the plane go down. Clift asked if the U.S. side could interview them. Osipov replied in the affirmative, if they could be found.

On the 10 September 1956 incident, Clift requested that the Russians try to find data in all available archives.

Clift asked about the possibility of more gun camera pictures for the 2 September 1958 shootdown. Osipov said that all the photos hadn't turned out. COL Parr went through the photos and noted that the numbering was not consecutive. Osipov said that all military documents from 1953-on are classified. Krayushkin said, well, let's ask them again. Clift asked if we could interview the pilots. Osipov agreed, if they could be located.

Clift asked about the disposition of the body of MAJ Eugene Posa from the 1 July 1960 shootdown. Krayushkin agreed to look again, but asked if the American side really wants the body after all this time. Clift said yes. Clift said that our information indicates that the body would have been taken to Severomorsk. Krayushkin agreed to try to contact the people involved.

On the 14 December 1965 incident, Clift asked that the Russians check all Air Defense and Naval records of the units on the scene.

Osipov said that the Russian side would review all documents in all cases, with particular emphasis on the 8 April 1950 and 29 July 1953 cases. This is what we will do for the future.

On that note, the working group concluded the day's session.

CONCLUSION: The 1 September working group session was productive. The promise of new documents on 9 of the 10 incidents should assist in the Commission's work. The promise of further research on each of the incidents similarly should assist. The contribution of Gen. Sozinov to the Commission's work on the C-130 shootdown will aid efforts to account for those still unaccounted for from that incident. The hard work by the U.S. side on each of the 10 incidents, shared with the Russian side before the August- September session, spurred the Russians into producing the most information thus far on Cold War shootdowns.

ANNEX D TO JCSB TRIWEEKLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 21 AUGUST--10 SEPTEMBER 1993

SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT OF FINAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE JOINT U.S. -RUSSIAN COMMISSION'S AUG-SEP 1993 MEETING.

NOTE: This session took place at 10 A.M. on 2 September 1993, in the Malyi Zal of Kremlin Building # 14.

Ambassador Toon: "We've agreed that I'm the chairman for today. I'll admit it's not an enviable job. There are unruly elements on both sides of the table. So I hope they'll help by behaving properly."

"First, thank you, General, for the splendid reception yesterday evening. You were your usual genial self, and even some of your colleagues smiled."

"General, on the serious side, during Tuesday's remarks, I noted that our primary goal was a frank exchange in joint working groups. Based on briefings from Congressman Peterson, Mr. Kauzlarich and

Mr. Clift, I'm pleased to report we've achieved our objective, and they'll report later on the working groups."

"Now, your research--obviously the hard work of several months--was helpful in our discussions. Moreover, we're grateful for the willingness and candor you demonstrated over the past two days. This cooperation finally produced a detailed give and take we have sought but not always had. I detect a new momentum in our work, a truly unprecedented level of cooperation on POW/MIA issues. I am particularly encouraged by the progress on Cold War shootdowns--I understand your preparations were helpful on all ten cases. This marks an important step forward in the work of the Joint Commission, and should allow us to resolve these cases once and for all, as I've told you. This is a matter of great importance to the population and family members in the United States."

"I'm also pleased by the Korean Working Group's conclusion that we must develop all leads contained in the information presented by Mr. Kauzlarich. I think you'll agree, General Volkogonov, that several agencies within the Soviet Government would have had a great interest in interrogating U.S. POWs and transporting them to the Soviet Union. Given the close relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, it's likely that North Korea would have permitted this action. For these reasons, we must work together to explore this in greater detail."

"Similarly, I am encouraged by your willingness to cooperate on questions on Vietnam War POWs. I believe we must explore several questions. At the same time, I realize its less likely that POWs were transported to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War than during the Korean War."

"I continue to think that a variety of Soviet agencies would have sought access to U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia, but I also came to realize that relations between Moscow and Hanoi were much worse than we realized--it's clear in the documents turned over in the last two meetings. Therefore, North Vietnam was less likely to allow access to POWs than were the North Koreans."

"Finally, General, about your remaining questions regarding the Golf-class submarine which sunk in the Pacific in 1968. One of the documents you provided on Tuesday indicates you believe your submarine sank following a collision with the U.S. "Swordfish" sub. As I told you on Wednesday, our Director of Naval Intelligence concluded that no U.S. sub was within 300 nautical miles of your sub at the time it sank. However, after receiving your comments, I again checked with U.S. intelligence authorities and they checked all logs of U.S. subs in the Pacific in March 1968. They reiterated that your sub did not sink as a result of a collision with the "Swordfish" or any other U.S. sub. Nevertheless, I pledge to look deeper into this issue. I've asked our Acting National Archivist Trudy Peterson to check the archives of previous Presidential National Security Advisors for information."

"As we look to the future, we must continue work on the Cold War and the Korean War. I also believe it's important that our search team here in Moscow, Task Force Russia, be allowed to continue its invaluable work for the foreseeable future I sense that our cooperation must now be pulling us toward important breakthroughs. It's more important than ever that we work together to solve the remaining questions and to do our humanitarian duty."

"Now I'd like to turn to my Colleagues, Congressman Peterson, Mr. Kauzlarich, and Mr. Clift for their presentations, and, after each presentation, I'll call on your side to offer their responses.

General Volkogonov: "Honored Ambassador Toon, esteemed American colleagues, I and my colleagues can say that our work has transpired in a truly cooperative atmosphere. I would say that, in the course from our first to our sixth plenary session, we can say we achieved results and also that we've achieved friendly relations. I'd like to underscore our main mission of attaining the truth. Our humanitarian goals have a great impact, and help build trust between our nations."

"As regards the working groups over the past three days, I took part in only one--the Korean War Working Group. But I know they all made progress. I have a few general observations."

"About Korea--I believe we must look to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Security for additional information, and your research helps. Your logical arguments and conclusions as to the possible transfer of POWs might, with respect, be treated as an interesting hypothesis. Unfortunately, we do not have adequate documents or eyewitness information to support them. Therefore, we've agree to pursue two directions that must provide further answers."

"First, to look into the archives of the "special camps" where most foreigners were held up to 1956. Americans might have been held. Also, we will analyze the personnel archives of several design bureaus active at that time, so, if there are any traces of Americans, we'll find them."

"On Vietnam, I'm satisfied in the judgement of both sides and satisfied that you see that relations between the Soviet Union and Vietnam were difficult despite the fact that we were allies. As far as the "1205" document you received from us, we are convinced that it is genuine. Let me stress that we are not convinced of all of the documents contents. But only Hanoi can ultimately vouch for the truth of its contents. In my judgement, your side of the Commission should direct its questions toward Hanoi--they might shed some light on it."

"On the Cold War...yesterday it held long and interesting discussions. Much more is known now, but we need more facts about the Vladivostok and Baltic Sea incidents. These need more attention. We agree with the U.S. side that we must fully answer all questions, concentrating on Korea and the Cold War."

"I am in agreement with Ambassador Toon that the co-chairmen from the Russian side should also speak."

Toon: "Thank you, General. Let me make a comment on what you said. Your suggestion on the avenues to resolve the Korean War issue was just right. I hope that, in the course of the next few months, we'll clarify this."

"On Vietnam, you're absolutely right. The answers must come from Hanoi. We have reported in full to your Washington embassy on the results of our meetings with Hanoi after our receipt of the "1205" document, and we will continue to inform you on our talks with Vietnam."

"On the Cold War shootdowns, we know we can count on you to help resolve these cases. As I told you before, we will do all we can to find out about your missing personnel from "the Cold War."

"Now I'd like to call upon our first working group co- chairman, Congressman Peterson."

Congressman Peterson: "Thank you, Ambassador Toon, General Volkogonov. The Vietnam Working Group had a successful meeting. Of particular significance was the very informative, factual and insightful report presented by our Russian co-chairman, Mr. Kozlov. His report became, to a large extent, the basis of our discussions. Mr. Kozlov especially helped give us a new awareness of the relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. His analysis noted the potential for the USSR's exploitation of U.S. POWs in Vietnam. The information in his report will allow our working group to identify the most promising areas for further investigation."

Colonel Mazurov (interrupting): "I don't understand the last phrase." Congressman Peterson repeats his last two sentences verbatim.

Mazurov: "All right, do we have a different understanding of the word 'exploitation?' That word is incorrect. We didn't exploit anyone.

Peterson: "I said, 'potential for exploitation.' I never said such a thing happened."

Volkogonov: "Dear colleagues, let's not argue."

Peterson: "We were impressed by the very thorough review contained in Mr. Kozlov's work, and pleased

to learn that the new Russian laws will still allow access to the military archives. We also appreciate the willingness of the Russian side to show great imagination and the initiative to explore new areas. In fact, that effort already uncovered a valuable new document in the Civil Aviation Archives. This shows that there is still the potential for significant discoveries in our future work. We must leave no stone unturned."

"As Mr. Mazurov so wisely noted during our discussions, we cannot reach conclusions based on a single piece of information that cannot be substantiated. The two sides agreed that the archival research is not complete. We also agreed to establish stronger working relations with our group to exchange information as soon as it is discovered."

"We agreed to several other specific tasks to complete over the next few months. One task of significance is our planned search for equipment transported to the USSR during the Vietnam War. We want to see if there is a connection between specific pieces of equipment and our MIAs from Vietnam."

"With the help of our Russian colleagues, this approach proved valuable during the examination of the F-111 crew capsule. We want to especially note the outstanding contributions and hard work of our Russian colleagues. The information presented during this working group session was extremely valuable and allowed us to come closer to solving the complex puzzle surrounding the question of our MIAs."

"Given the results of our working group session, I am confident that we will complete our future tasks. That completes my report."

Toon: "Thank you, Congressman. Now your comments, Mr. Kozlov."

Kozlov: "Thank you. I concur with your evaluation of our work. During this session, we addressed two complexes of questions. Those questions ranged from those raised by the co-chairman, speaking of the hypothetical transfer of U.S. POWs to the USSR. I'd like to say that my colleague made a presumption with an initial probability of fifty per cent or more. I believe that, after listening to our report, the rate presumption decreased. This is the main result of our discussion. In the course of the discussions, we also admitted that we must continue our search."

"The U.S. side raised several unexpected and interesting possibilities for searches--for instance, in archives, museums and interviews."

"I would like to observe that I think we have reduced your doubts concerning the "1205" document. Today we are passing you more documents confirming that there are no more follow-up documents to the "1205" document. Still, we have agreed to expand the general search of both archival and non-archival sources, especially with regard to the archives of the special services. We will transfer any documentary information we find on POWs to you in a timely manner, as confirmed by the GRU representative."

"As to the six-volume report referred to by Ambassador Toon...well, it doesn't address Vietnam, just the GRU."

"The U.S. side received a list of shootdowns in Vietnam compiled from intelligence reports. Now we will review the archives of the committee dealing with solidarity for Europe and Asia."

"The U.S. side proposed reviewing all passenger lists on airplanes and vessels for the '60s and '70s to find names of Americans who might have been taken aboard. But such a search is impossible. The documents have been destroyed. But our transportation archives will be searched for relevant information. We will look into the possibility of interviews with transportation personnel dealing with military transport to and from Vietnam."

"On Sary Shagan, there has been a great deal of evaluation of this incident, and I assure my American colleagues of our cooperation and the cooperation of Kazakh archivists. We'll be working with them in October."

"We'll work with the military museums to review their holdings of items that might have been shipped from Vietnam." our work, how to expedite sharing

"Now, on how to improve our work, how to expedite sharing documents--I want to say that we resolved this much: all agreed that we are not looking for traces of [word indistinct]. We deal only with real documents, real facts. I hope our analysis is absolutely impartial, but I believe the possibility that U.S. POWs were transferred from Vietnam is approximately zero."

"I'd like to make an emotional comment. When I look Mr. Peterson in the eyes, I see not only the eyes of a courageous and intelligent man, but also of a responsible man charged by his compatriots with resolving POW fates--and I see the eyes of an honest man."

Toon: "Thank you.

Peterson: "Thank you. I agree and return the statement exactly as you said it. The detail Mr. Kozlov went into extends through the other taskings in my report."

"I would like to clarify my remark about 'potential exploitation.' The fifty per cent hypothesis was not of my origin. It was just contained in Mr. Kozlov's analysis. But I do intend to project in my report that there was much less potential that what we previously thought."

"Sorry, but there is a difference here. This was a Mazurov: hypothesis and we don't want the U.S. media to use the word 'exploitation.'

Peterson: "In our usage, the inference is not the same. But, if you object, we'll take back the word 'exploitation.

Toon: "I have the impression our two co-chairmen got along very well."

Volkogonov: "Agreed."

Toon: "I'd like to call on Mr Kauzlarich on Korea."

Kauzlarich: "Thank you. Our working group also had an excellent spirit of cooperation. The Russian side provided two sets of additional information. First, they provided additional interrogation information. While our initial examination suggests that there are no new individual MIAs identified in these documents, they do provide additional information on individuals on whom we were previously given interrogation reports. We appreciate the new information and will examine it carefully."

"The second set of documents related to the Russian list of shootdowns of U.S. aircraft during the Korean War. We will review this information, too, and may come back with requests for additional information."

"We spent a considerable amount of time discussing the report the U.S. side presented on the transfer of POWs from Korea to the Soviet Union. We agreed that this report and the discussion would provide further direction both for archival research and interviews with Russian citizens. We established basic points of agreement."

"One or possibly more F-86 fighter aircraft were brought back to Russia. However, the Russian side has not yet agreed with the U.S. belief that pilots or other crew members were brought back to the USSR."

"We also established that there was direct and indirect Soviet contact in the interrogation of U.S. POWs in the Korean War."

"While the Russian side maintains that POWs were not transported to the USSR, we believe--the U.S. side--that there is abundant evidence that U.S. POWs were taken to the Soviet Union."

"Based on our discussion, in addition to the two points raised by General Volkogonov in his presentations, the Russian side also agreed to provide copies of the telegrams from Stalin on involvement in the Korean War These are meant to establish the distance Stalin wanted to maintain regarding the war.

Volkogonov: "We'll pass you the cables."

Kauzlarich: "Another area relates to the examination of specific interrogation files on specific MIAs. We identified these individuals in our report. Also, the U.S. side agreed to examine our own archives regarding Soviet aircraft losses during the Korean War."

"Finally, Mr. Chairman, we established the basis for true cooperation to resolve the issue of MIAs in the Korean War. Thank you."

[Toon recognizes Co-chairman Colonel Mukhin]

Mukhin: "Esteemed colleagues, my mission is to present an outline of the evidence. Briefly, I'll outline the work conducted in the Russian archives. There are four major complexes of documents: interrogation reports; documents from political organs on the Korean War; air defense materials; and documents of fighter aviation passed yesterday. We must actualize the direction of future work."

"Mr. Kauzlarich passed us names of individuals whose files should be in our archives. Work is already in progress at Podol'sk. He also gave us a list of names of individuals who should have had contact with Americans. But I have to underline that, in the military archives, there are no documents on the transport of U.S. POWs. But we continue our work in every direction."

"I would like to point out to the U.S. side the list of our MIAs. We'll pass additional information to Colonel Parr. We must operate on a reciprocal basis. I heard Ambassador Toon assign Mrs. Peterson the job of finding documents on the submarine case--it interests us very much. We want documents on why your sub suddenly underwent repairs in the port of Yokesuka. According to our records, your submarine's periscope was bent 45 degrees."

"To summarize our meetings, we worked in a friendly atmosphere. We understood each other, and I look forward to closer contact in the future."

Toon: "We'll take your remarks on the submarine into account. Now I'll call on Mr Clift on the Cold War."

Clift: "Thank you. The working group on the Cold War had a very productive session yesterday. Colonel Osipov, General Krayushkin and their colleagues worked throughout the day on the ten Cold War cases. We divided our work into two phases. In the morning, the Russian side presented to us information they had uncovered since the last session of the Commission. All told, we received new documents relating to nine of the ten Cold War incidents. These documents will help put each incident into a much clearer perspective. They include reports from fleet commanders and area commanders to their chiefs in Moscow, and include reports from high-level officials, both civilian and military, to the Central Committee."

"Additionally, we spent at least an hour with the commander of the forces who shot down the C-130 over Armenia. General Sosinov was very forthcoming in his reconstruction of the incident, including specifics of the attack."

"Further, our Russian colleagues provided us with gun-camera and ground camera photographs, and we are moving immediately to provided copies to our colleagues working outside Yerevan to help them in their work."

"In the afternoon, we went back through each case and discussed what remained to be done. We requested specific information from the archives of the Navy, Border Guards, and air defense units, as

well as information from the security services and intelligence services on each of these incidents. In each case, our Russian colleagues received our requests positively and said they would work with us in the coming months.

"In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, General Volkogonov, let me stress the importance of the information we expect to find in the archives at Gatchina and Podol'sk. We want an agreement from our Russian colleagues to work with us to make this information available. Thank you, Mr. Chairman."

[Toon recognizes LTC Osipov.]

Osipov: "I'd like to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues for the atmosphere of cooperation we achieved. I fully agree with the remarks prepared by my American colleague. From our side, let we say we are prepared to continue our work with the Americans in search of the lost crews. But there are no documents or information available now that show any possibility that any pilots or crews are still alive in Russia.

"We fully realize the concern of the American authorities with the fate of every one of their citizens lost. That is why we cooperate so closely."

"We paid special attention to the Baltic episode in '50 and the Far East incident in '52. In the first case, we are almost completely convinced that the crew died. But Mrs. Reynolds was here and we see the need to produce final documentary proof."

"In the second case, we don't fully understand the fate of the crew. We'll make a list of eyewitnesses and a list of intercept crews in order to find out what happened. We'll let our American colleagues interview them. Thank you.

Toon: "General Volkogonov, on the basis of what we've heard here today, I believe we've found a good *modus operandi*. I think we can look forward to closer cooperation between both sides. If it should prove necessary for our co-chairmen to meet with your co- chairmen, I'm sure it can be arranged."

"General, I had intended to call on Colonel Parr to discuss his work as head of Task Force Russia. Unfortunately, time is short. But I hope that if Colonel Parr has any problems he can feel free to discuss them with you."

"As to future work, I assume the working groups will continue their work and report to us if there are any problems. Meanwhile, I suggest we plan tentatively for the next meeting of our Commission at the end of November, with the precise date to be settled through diplomatic channels."

"I wish to thank you, General, for being your usual genial and cooperative self. It was a satisfactory meeting, and I look forward to the next."

Volkogonov: "Before we move to the press conference, I want to pass a number of documents to you. This is GRU information related to shootdowns of U.S. aircraft in Vietnam and the Cold War. I'm passing it now. I also ask for your help in resolving the fates of Soviet citizens--I'm passing a list of aviators, Naval personnel and advisors who died in carrying out their duty. We would appreciate your help."

"I believe the end of November or the beginning of November would be good. We will concentrate on the problems we discussed in the plenary sessions and the working groups."

"I hope our commission's atmosphere of cooperation continues and promotes future good relations and solves outstanding problems."

Toon: "I agree that we've had a good session and appreciate all the documents--which will provide me with reading material for the long flight home."

[Toon adjourns the meeting.]

ANNEX E TO JCSB TRIWEEKLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 21 AUGUST -10 SEPTEMBER 1993

Interview of Retired Colonel Evegenii Georgievich Pepelyaev, Russian Air Force

1. On 6 September 1993, Joint Commission Support Branch (JCSB) members Hindrichs, Blasser, and Eastman interviewed Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel (ret) Evegenii Georgievich Pepelyaev at the Radisson Slavyanskaya Hotel in Moscow, Russia. Col Pepelyaev currently resides at 11396 Moskva, Zelonyi Prospect 66, k. 1, apt 44, telephone number 301-50- 07. The subject of the interview was Pepelyaev's experiences during the Korean War.

2. Contact with Colonel Pepelyaev was established with the JCSB on 5 September 1993 at a dining-out hosted for ACES HIGH, an organization of retired American combat fliers, by their Russian counterparts. Colonel Pepelyaev was introduced to team members Hindrichs and Blasser concerning one of Pepelyaev's Korean War victories. Pepelyaev was interested in finding out what happened to the flier of the aircraft that he shot down on 6 October 1951. On this date, he shot down an F-86 which landed on the beach along the Yellow Sea, Korea. He was told that the pilot of this aircraft was rescued by a helicopter. Pepelyaev was interested in finding out if this pilot was still alive with the possibility of eventually establishing contact with him. An interview for the following day was set up.

3. Pepelyaev was based at Dandong (formerly Antung), China, from the middle of December 1950 to 31 January 52 as the commanding officer of the 196th Fighter Aviation Regiment assigned to the 324th Division of the 64th Air Corps. When he was first assigned there, he was subordinated to General Kozhedub, CO of the 324th Division, and to General Belov of the 64th Air Corps. His command consisted of 30 pilots and all the supporting personnel. On 1 May 1952, the ranks of the 64th Air Corps swelled when the 309th Division arrived at Antung. In addition to the Russians, the airfield at Antung was also used by the Chinese and Koreans. While Pepelyaev was stationed at Antung, General Belov was relieved by General Lobov. He described General Belov as a weak, indecisive leader. He stated that General Lobov is alive and is his close personal friend and promised to get in touch with Lobov for the JCSB.

4. Colonel Pepelyaev was officially credited with 19 victories in Korea, of which 11 or 12 were F-86s. He was subsequently decorated as a Hero of the Soviet Union. He is convinced that he shot down six aircraft, damaged the remainder, and is unsure of their ultimate fate. He saw five of his victories disintegrate in mid-air and he saw one F-86 land on the coast of the Yellow Sea. Of the five aircraft that disintegrated, he only saw one crash. This was an F-80 Shooting Star that he observed from an altitude of 3000-4000 meters it crashed slightly north of Seoul, South Korea, on 1 December 1951. On 6 October 1951, he shot at an F-86, decorated with black and white stripes from a distance of approximately 130 meters. He saw his cannon fire strike behind the canopy and believes that he damaged the ejection seat mechanism. He believes this is the reason that the pilot did not eject. He watched the F-86 land on the mud flats by the Yellow Sea. He was later told by Soviet technicians sent out to recover the crashed aircraft that the pilot was recovered by a helicopter. Later in the day, the US Air Force tried to destroy the aircraft by bombing it but were unsuccessful. That night, technicians from the 324th Division arrived, cut the wings off, and took it to the airfield at Antung. Pepelyaev stated that he personally saw the aircraft and even sat in the cockpit. He has no information on the subsequent disposition of the aircraft, but doesn't rule out the possibility of it going to Moscow. He had no personal knowledge of any F-86s going to Moscow, but believes that if they were taken, they would have gone to the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI) and would still exist somewhere to this day. The aircraft was damaged but all of the instruments in the cockpit were in perfect working order. He doesn't recall either the tail number or the squadron number on the F-86.

5. In comparison to the F-86, Mig-15 instruments were rudimentary at best. Pepelyaev stated that the artificial horizon on the Mig-15 had only a 30 degree port/starboard swing from center and that the gunsight and the angle of attack indicator were very poor in comparison. In 1955, the artificial horizon

was replaced on the MIG-15 and the gunsight was replaced in 1956. Pepelyaev stated that both the 23mm and 30mm cannons on the MIG-15 were very reliable. The MIG-15, with a copied English engine, was replaced in May-June 1951 by the MIG-15 BIS, which was equipped with the more powerful VK-1 engine and a better braking system.

6. Colonel Pepelyaev stated that his regiment was generally known as the best Soviet regiment in the Korean War. There were many aces in his regiment from World War II and there were at least six aces that he believed deserved to be Heroes of the Soviet Union. He stated that politics played a role in the award of the Hero of the Soviet Union title and that some of the heroes that emerged from the Korean War did not deserve the title. He believes that his unit was snubbed in decorations and that many of the victories that his six pilots had were given to politically-correct fliers. Only one other pilot, who received the Hero of the Soviet Union Award on the list of Hero pilots (given to the JCSB by Major Amirov through Dr. Paul Cole) was from his unit. This is 1LT Fyodor Akimovich Shibanov, who perished on 26 October 1951. During his tenure as the CO of the 196th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Pepelyaev's pilots claim to have shot down 100 US and Allied aircraft, with losses of only ten aircraft.

7. Pepelyaev stated that in order to receive credit for a kill, one or a combination of three forms of evidence were needed. These were the 1) gun camera film, 2) testimony of other pilots who witnessed the victory , or 3) testimony of the local authorities. He has personal knowledge that the gun camera films are located in the archives at Podol'sk as he has seen them. The gun camera functioned similar to US gun cameras as they were activated when the trigger was pressed. In his opinion, the gun cameras functioned reliably.

8. While Pepelyaev was stationed in China, he was not allowed to record any of his flights in his personal flight log. All information was kept on a master list maintained by the division. In his personal flight log there is a blank period showing no flight time from Dec 50 to 31 Jan 52. A similar situation exists with his medical records. He was hospitalized in 1943 for heart palpitations. While he was fighting in Korea, the situation was aggravated and he was hospitalized again in 1951. He believes his condition was aggravated because of the lack of "G" suits. His medical records show no evidence of this and he had heard that they are kept in a classified archive in Khabarovsk.

9. Pepelyaev had very little information on POWs. He personally never saw any POWs but had heard that they were very poorly treated by the Koreans and the Chinese. He stated that intelligence officers were rarely given access to them. He said that there was an intelligence section at the 64th Corps which consisted of a chief and one or two assistants. He had heard that, when an enemy plane was shot down, the intelligence section would send out search parties. When one of their aircraft was shot down, they would commandeer a vehicle and form and ad hoc search party. He has no knowledge of Colonel Orlov but did meet Plotnikov later on in his career. The only intelligence officer he knew in Korea was a Gennadij Semenovich Donets, who now lives in Chita. He has not been in touch with him for two years and promised to go home and look for his address and telephone number to pass to TFR.

10. The subject of General Blagoveshchenskij caused humorous recollections for Pepelyaev. He recollected that Blagoveshchenskij arrived at Antung with 15 test pilots. His mission was to force an F-86 to land by surrounding it with MIG-15s. He repeatedly referred to this as an idiotic idea. Blagoveshchenskij's pilots alternated flying with Pepelyaev's pilots, 10-12 at a time. Blagoveshchenskij's pilots used Pepelyaev's aircraft when they went on missions and had earlier trained at the Soviet airfields at Mukden and An Shan. Blagoveshchenskij's unit departed from China in October 1951. Only one of Blagoveshchenskij's pilots was lost and this was a flier named Tsipenko, who died during a practice formation landing in a crosswind. He believes that Blagoveshchenskij was trying to capture an intact pressure suit system. He knows Blagoveshchenskij personally and stated that he is still alive and subsequently had commanded the All-Union Scientific Institute of the Air Force (VNII VVS). He lives in Moscow and will probably refuse to speak with TFR, since he is still embarrassed with the absurdity of his mission.

11. Other Information:

a. Does not know General Dzhakhadzhe.

b. A pilot's pension is not dependent on his number of victories. Hero of the Soviet Union does have bearing on one's pension.

c. Believes that, overall, American pilots were better qualified than Soviet pilots. Some Soviet pilots arrived not fully trained.

d. Supplied the telephone numbers for the *U.S. News* correspondent in Moscow, who wrote an article on Soviet involvement in Korea. Thinks he might have more leads and wants copies of the article. He is:

Douglas Stanglin Home phone: 137-60-78 Office 938-20-78

ANNEX F TO JCSB TRIWEEKLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 21 AUGUST-10 SEPTEMBER 1993

Resolution of Alleged Soviet Ramming of a USAF RF-4 on 28 November 1973, with Response to Congressional Inquiry .

1. On 24 August 1993, Joint Commission Support Branch (JCSB) received a congressional inquiry from the office of Senator McCain concerning a constituent request about a possible ramming incident involving a Germany-based fighter pilot and a USAF RF-4. The constituent referenced an article appearing in the British publication Air International, which published a letter from a Belgian enthusiast concerning the incident on 28 November 1973. The column reproduced a photograph of a museum display board that appeared to show such a ramming, but provided little additional detail other than that the ramming was accomplished by the now-deceased Captain Eliseev, then of the 20 Guards Fighter Regiment in Templin, Germany.

2. On 7 September 1993, JCSB members Hindrichs and Blasser visited Templin Air Base, Germany, home of the 20th Guards Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment. After identifying themselves as members of the JCSB, they were received by Colonel Pilot 1st Class BOBROV, commander of the regiment, who, after consultation with higher headquarters, allowed the members to view the museum. The director of the museum and the officer who had the background information on the displays immediately explained to the team that the ramming incident had indeed occurred. Captain Eliseev, a past squadron commander at Templin, had been transferred to Khabardino, near the Georgian Border, after having served at Templin. While on border patrol, he encountered a Turkish F- 4 border violator. Not having cannon on his aircraft and being too close to use missiles, he rammed the intruder, causing both aircraft to crash. Eliseev died of his wounds and was decorated with the award Hero of the Soviet Union on 14 December 1973. Both Hindrichs and Blasser are satisfied with this explanation, particularly since the unit had no time to prepare for the visit.

3. On 13 September 1993, author Stephen Zaloga, well-known aviation author, confirmed to Hindrichs that this incident had been written up in a Soviet publication entitled "Post War Heroes of the PVO."

4. JCSB considers this incident closed.

Annex G to JCSB Triweekly Report for the period 21 August -10 September 1993

Annex G consist of a series of documents given to Ambassador Tune by General Volkogonov at the Joint Commission meeting in Moscow 31 August to 2 September 1993. All names have been transliterated, not analyzed, and rendered in their English spellings.

TFR 179 SUMMARY

TFR 179-1 to 179-2

Two pages of undated, but recent documents summarizing the shootdown and capture of aviators in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Gives dates and reports that 94-97 aircraft were shot down and 58 aviators were captured from 24 Jul 65 through 27 Jun 72. This appears to be a recent Russian analysis from other documents and was probably prepared specifically for the August Joint Commission meeting.

TFR 179-3 to 179-5

Three page undated report of Hoang Anh, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, to its 20th Plenum which was held at the end of December 70 to the beginning of January 71. Reports that the total number of captured American pilots in the DRV is 735.

TFR 180 SUMMARY

TFR 180-1 to 180-119

List of 1057 American aircraft shot down by fighter aircraft over North Korea during 1950-53 in 815 separate incidents. This is a recent Russian analysis compiled from documents in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense.

TFR 181 SUMMARY

TFR 181-1 to 181-4

Four page summary titled "Information about American aircraft, which violated the borders of the USSR during the Cold War Period". Information is in columnar form giving dates, locations, aircraft types, and circumstances of 12 Cold War border violations.

TFR 182 SUMMARY

TFR 182-1 to 182-3

Undated interrogation report of Lt. Col. Dzhurado, service number A16292, 25th Air Squadron, 4th Fighter/Interceptor Group, who was shot down by anti-aircraft artillery over Long-Dong Korea. It includes biographical data and his service record from March 1942 through October 1949.

TFR 182-4 to 182-5

Undated interrogation report of 1st Lieutenant Al'bert V. Khodzhera, service number AO 2224077, an F-86-F-30 pilot assigned to the 36th Air Squadron, 8th Fighter/Bomber Group, who was shot down on 19 June 1953 by anti-aircraft artillery fire. It contains biographical data, service record, and information on his unit to include equipment upgrades and a list of the unit's chain of command.

TFR 182-6 to 182-7

Stamp with date 18 Sep 52 on top of an interrogation report of 2Lt. Roland William Parks, a flier assigned to the 16th Squadron, 51st Fighter Wing, 5th Air Army. It contains biographical data, circumstances prior to his ejection from the aircraft, and capture by Chinese civilians. Provides standard aviation order of battle and numbers of equipment by type. He describes the air battle in which his F-86 "Sabre" was damaged and his subsequent capture.

TFR 182-8 to 182-9

Undated interrogation report of 2Lt. Edward Dzh. Izbiki, service number AO 2223853, a flier assigned to the 336 Air Squadron, 4th Fighter/Interceptor Group, who was shot down by a MIG-15 near Sanchu on 19 February 1953. It contains biographical data, circumstances surrounding the shoot down, and subsequent capture by Korean civilians.

TFR 182-10 to 182-11

Undated interrogation report of 1st Lieutenant Michael Edward Dermand, service number 20161-A, an F-86E pilot assigned to the 335 Air Squadron, 4th Fighter/Interceptor Group, who was shot down in the area of Syukusen by a MIG-15 on 21 April 1952. It contains biographical data, service record, circumstances of the shoot-down, and a detailed list of the pilot's emergency pack.

TFR 182-12 to 182-13

Undated interrogation report of 1Lt. Donald L. Pehip, an F- 86-E pilot and flight commander of "D" flight, 25th Air Squadron, 51st Fighter/Interceptor Group, who was shot down by a MIG-15 near the mouth of the Yalu river on 15 May 1953. It contains biographical data, circumstances surrounding the shoot-down, and his capture by Korean civilians as well as information about his unit's composition.

TFR 182-14 to 182-15

Undated interrogation report of Captain Robert A. Kovri, service number AO 687678, an F-86-F-30 pilot assigned to the 12th Air Squadron, 18th Fighter/Bomber Group , who was shot down on 20 Jun 1953 by anti-aircraft artillery fire. It contains biographical data, service record, and circumstances surrounding his capture by Chinese soldiers.

TFR 182-16

Page 3 of an interrogation document that contains information on how an unnamed pilot shot down three MIG-15s and what pilots are taught to do in case they are shot down.

TFR 182-17

Undated interrogation report of Captain Harold Bretislav Kubicek, a radar operator on a B-29 from the 93rd Bomber Squadron, 19th Bomber Group, 20th Air Army, who was taken prisoner on 23 January 1952. It contains the circumstances of his capture and his service record.

TFR 182-18 to 182-19

Undated interrogation report of 1Lt. "SPOT" John Uehsli Zvajker, service number AO 2222083, an F-80 pilot assigned to the 36th Air Squadron, 8th Fighter/Bomber Group, who was shot down by a MIG-15 in the area of Kajsen on 30 April 1952. It contains biographical data, circumstances surrounding the shoot-down, subsequent capture, as well as information on his unit composition and chain of command.

TFR 182-20 to 182-21

Undated interrogation report of 2Lt. Edward Dillozh, service number AO 2225458, an F-86-F-30 pilot assigned to the 12th Air Squadron, 18th Fighter/Bomber Group, who was shot down along the front lines on 15 June 1953 by anti- aircraft artillery fire. It contains biographical data and service record.

TFR 182-22

A cover letter dated 30 Mar 52, addressed to the USSR Air Force Chief of Staff, for a package of interrogations conducted by the "Chinese Comrades" on 6 personnel.

- 2Lt. Rajt, F-86 pilot
- 2Lt. Peterson, F-86 pilot
- 1Lt. Inok, B-26 navigator
- 1Lt. Kuin, B-26 flier
- Lt. Col. Trehsh, TBM-3 flier
- Maj. Richardson, flier

TFR 182-23 to 182-24

Undated interrogation report of Sgt. Donald Vil'yam Pinkstoun, service number A 2925, a flier assigned to the 77 Air Squadron, who was shot down on the front lines on 15 June 1953 by anti-aircraft artillery fire. It contains biographical data, service record, circumstances surrounding the shoot-down and subsequent capture, as well as data on his unit.

TFR 182-25

A cover letter dated 2 Feb 53, addressed to the Air Force Chief of Staff, for a packet of interrogation materials, captured and personal documents of Col. Arnold (581st Wing Commander) and 1Lt. Vuris who were shot down in a B-29 on the night of 13 January 1953. It indicates that the remaining documents from the other crew members were sent to Peking.

TFR 182-26

Undated interrogation report of Captain Zh. B. Smit of the 8th Air Squadron, 543rd (67th) Tactical Reconnaissance Group, who was shot down in the area of Pkhen'yan. It is a Russian translation of a Chinese report.

TFR 182-27

Undated interrogation report of 2Lt. Dzhek Eh. Khenderson of the 8th Fighter Group, 8th Fighter Wing, who was shot down on 31 August 1951, by anti-aircraft artillery. It is a Russian translation of a Chinese report

TFR 182-28

Undated interrogation report of Lt. Col. Dokal'd Dzh. Mak- Lellan, Commander of the 729th Squadron, 452nd Bomber Group, 452nd Bomber Wing, who was shot down on 8 May 1951. It is a Russian translation of a Chinese report.

TFR 182-29

Undated interrogation report of Captain Dzhenis V. Uilkens of the 312th Squadron, 33rd Air Group, 1st Wing (Marines), who was shot down on 3 July 1951 by anti-aircraft artillery. It is a Russian translation of a Chinese report.

TFR 183 SUMMARY

TFR 183-1 to 183-3

Three page undated summary of information regarding Soviet personnel, aircraft, and ships that are missing in action or missing outside of the borders of the former Soviet Union. Provided to the US side to aid in resolving these cases.

TFR 184 SUMMARY

TFR 184-1 to 184-45

Document dated 4 Sep 58 covering the findings of a commission that investigated the 2 Sep 58 C-130 shoot down. These are photocopies of TFR 137-5 to 137-49.

TFR 185 SUMMARY

TFR 185-1 to 185-2

Map showing location of shoot down of an American Neptune type bomber on 6 Nov 51 by two LA-11 fighters of Soviet 5th Fleet near Vladivostok.

TFR 185-3 to 185-4

Report dated 6 Nov 51 to Stalin from Kuznetsov detailing the 6 Nov 51 shoot down of a Neptune type bomber as reported by the Commander of the 5th Fleet.

TFR 185-5 to 185-7

Report dated 7 Nov 51 from the journal of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko detailing his meeting on 7 Nov 51 with the US Charge d'Affaires ad interim Kamming and US advisor Maksuini.

TFR 185-8

Recommendation for award (Order of the Red Banner) dated 17 Nov 51 from Kuznetsov to Stalin for La-11 pilots, I.Ya. Lukashev and M.K. Shchukin, involved in shoot down of Neptune type bomber on 6 Nov 51.

TFR 185-9

Draft dated Nov 51 of Supreme Soviet Decree awarding the Order of the Red Banner to Lukashev and Shchukin.

TFR 185-10

Note dated 27 Nov 51 to Stalin from Vasilevskij recommending A.A. Kalugin for the Order of the Red Banner for intercepting an American C-47 and forcing it to land on 19 Nov 51 at Papa airfield in Hungary.

TFR 185-11 to 185-12

Award recommendation dated 20 Nov 51 detailing 19 Nov 51 capture of an American C-47 and its crew of 2 Captains and 2 Sergeants over Hungary.

TFR 185-13 to 185-14

Report dated 12 May 52 to Stalin from Vasilevskij detailing 11 May 52 intercept of a US "Martin" aircraft, and the subsequent attack on that aircraft.

TFR 185-15

Map detailing the 11 May 52 incident.

TFR 185-16 to 185-22

Consists of a 1-page report to Stalin from Kuznetsov dated 13 Jun 52 on the shootdown of an American B-29, a map detailing the incident (divided into 4 pages), and a 2-page report dated 14 Jun 52 with updated information on the same shootdown. Second report does not mention the American aircraft opening fire first, while the first report does.

TFR 185-23

One-page map detailing the 7 Oct 52 shootdown of a US B-29 near Yurij Island, signed by Lt. Gen. Pavlovskij.

TFR 185-24 to 185-27

Excerpts from the report of Gen-Maj. of Aviation Makhun to the Air Force Command Staff dated 26 Oct 52 concerning the 7 Oct 52 violation of the State border by an American B-29 in the area of the Kurile Islands.

TFR 185-28 to 185-29

Report of Molotov to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the 7 Oct 52 incident dated 29 Dec 54.

TFR 185-30 to 185-60

Diplomatic note dated 25 Sep 54 from the US Ambassador Charles A. Bolen to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union V.M. Molotov concerning the 7 Oct 52 incident. Translation from English.

TFR 185-61 to 185-64

Excerpts from the report dated 9 Aug 53 of Gen-Maj. of Aviation Nevzorov to the Air Force Command Staff concerning the 29 Jul 53 violation of the State border by an American B-50 in the area of Vladivostok.

TFR 185-65 to 185-66

Report dated 30 Jul 53 of Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov to the Minister of Defense of the USSR N.A. Bulganin concerning the 29 Jul 53 incident.

TFR 185-67 to 185-70

Diplomatic note dated 5 Aug 53 from the US Embassy concerning the 29 Jul 53 incident. Translation from the English.

TFR 185-71

Note dated 27 Oct 1953 to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Voroshilov from Minister of Defense Bulganin concerning the 29 Jul 53 incident.

TFR 185-72 to 185-75

Undated list of American overflights of Soviet cargo vessels between 1 Jan 54 to 24 Jun 54 in the area of Taiwan. Signed by the Asst. Chief of the Countries of America Dept.

TFR 185-76 to 185-78

Report to the Minister of Defense dated 5 Sep 54 on the shootdown of a Neptune on 4 Sep 54. Signed by the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Navy Admiral Basistij and the Chief of the Main Headquarters of the Navy Admiral Fokin.

TFR 185-79

Letter dated 3 Nov 54 and signed by the Minister of Defense N. Bulganin recommending the Red Banner award be given to the Soviet pilots involved in the 4 Sep 54 shootdown of a US Neptune aircraft.

TFR 185-80 to 185-81

Report to Bulganin on the 7 Nov 54 shootdown of an American B-29 in the area of Yuzhno-Kuril'sk.

Dated 7 Nov 54 and signed by Gen. Army Biryuzov.

TFR 185-82 to 185-84

Consists a 20 Apr 55 report by Zhukov to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union about the 18 Apr 55 shootdown of a US B-47 in the Far East (1 pg), and another report dated 22 Apr on the same incident signed by Molotov and Zhukov (2 pgs).

TFR 185-85

Letter dated 11 Jan 55 signed by Bulganin recommending the Red Banner award be given to the Soviet pilots involved in the 7 Nov 54 shootdown of an American B-29 aircraft.

TFR 185-86 to 185-87

Letter dated 25 Jun 55 from Zhukov informing the Presidium of the Central Committee that an investigation into the 23 Jun 55 shootdown of a Neptune is being conducted.

TFR 185-88 to 185-90

Undated letter to Molotov concerning the 23 Jun 55 shootdown of a US "Neptune" aircraft.

TFR 185-91

Report dated 4 July 55 of Zhukov to the Central Committee on the 23 Jun 55 incident.

TFR 185-92 to 185-93

9 Sep 55 report of Sokolovskij on the 18 Apr 55 shootdown of an American RB-47 near Kamchatka addressed to the Central Committee. Details Captain Rubtsov's heroism and request that he be awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

TFR 185-94

Undated letter asking to proof the attached draft note dated 8 Mar 56 to the US State Department in connection with the incident involving the American "Neptune", and instructing the Minister of Finance to issue a sum of $724,947.68 (American) for transfer to the US Secretary of State.

TFR 185-95 to 185-96

2 page report dated 28 Jun 58 signed by Sokolovskij and Yakovlev on the 27 Jun 58 shootdown of a C-118 near Erevan. Names Soviet pilots Svetlishnikov and Zakharov, and US crew members Brenner, Lajls, Allan, Krams, and Lyuter.

TFR 185-97

First page of a report dated 1 Jul 58 from the KGB to the Central Committee on the 27 Jun 58 incident.

TFR 185-98

Note dated 30 Jun 58 from the Secretary of the Central Committee ordering the transfer of the American crew that was forced to land on Soviet territory to US authorities.

TFR 185-99

Second page of document started on TFR 185-97. Signed by the Chairman of the KGB I. Serov.

TFR 185-100

Letter dated 3 Jul 58 from the Secretary of the Central Committee to Gromyko, Serov, and Demichev on the second note to the US government in connection with the 27 Jun 58 incident.

TFR 185-101 to 185-103

Undated draft letter in response to the 11 Jul 58 note from the US State Department in reference to 27 Jun 58 incident.

TFR 185-104

Letter handed over to M.N. Smirnovskij by 1st Secretary D. Mark on 6 Sep 58 concerning the 2 Sep 58 shootdown of an American C-130.

TFR 185-105

Letter dated 18 Sep 58 from the Secretary of the Central Committee concerning what to issue to the press about the 2 Sep 58 incident and about the transfer of the six crew members' bodies to the American authorities.

TFR 185-106

Letter dated 14 Sep 58 signed by Kuznetsov, Konev, and Ivashutin concerning the 2 Sep 58 incident.

TFR 185-107 to 185-108

Draft letter of TFR 185-105. With attachment.

TFR 185-109 to 185-110

Excerpt dated 20 Sep 58 from the daily journal of V.V. Kuznetsov detailing the 19 Sep 58 meeting with the temporary Charge d'Affaires Davis on the 2 Sep 58 incident.

TFR 185-111

Note dated 2 Oct 58 on the transfer of the bodies from the 2 Sep 58 incident.

TFR 185-112

Letter dated 1 Oct 58 to the Central Committee signed by Konev and Ivashutin regarding the 2 Sep 58 incident.

TFR 185-113 to 185-115

Undated draft memorandum to the US President on the 2 Sep 58 incident. Informs him that only 6 corpses were found and that the fate of the other 11 crew members in unknown.

TFR 185-116

Letter dated 4 Jun 59 to the Central Committee from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasizing the constant overflights by American aircraft of Soviet territory. Ministry of Foreign Affairs requires a note be sent to the US Government protesting these overflights.

TFR 185-117 to 185-118

Letter dated 6 Dec 58 from Gromyko to the Central Committee concerning the 2 Sep 58 incident.

TFR 185-119 to 185-120

Same as above, but with the additional signature of Sokolovskij. Dated 6 Dec 58.

TFR 185-121 to 185-124

Undated TASS announcement on the 2 Sep 58 incident.

TFR 185-125 to 185-126

Letter dated 18 Apr 59 to the Central Committee from the Secretary of the Kamchatka Oblast KPSS detailing the number of violations of the State border by foreign aircraft and naval vessels.

TFR 185-127 to 185-132

Notes with a 9 May 59 stamp detailing the meeting of Khrushchev with American Ambassador Thompson with regard to the 2 Sep 58 incident.

TFR 185-133 to 185-137

Five, undated, out-of-order pages that are a time line of the 2 Sep 58 incident, starting with the violation of the State border on 2 Sep and ending with the publication of the information surrounding the event and a full chronological account.

TFR 186 SUMMARY

TFR 186-1 to 186-12

Twelve page undated report covering the activities of the International Investigatory Commission's 16 Jul - 1 Aug 70 trip to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Commission consisted of G. Frank of Sweden and A.I. Poltorak (report author). They met with several North Vietnamese Commissions to include the North Vietnamese Commission investigating US war crimes. They were taken to various sights where these alleged crimes took place, met with locals, and given the opportunity to talk to three US aviators and one deserter. No names given.

TFR 186-13 to 186-16

Four page Russian translation of a North Vietnamese document dated 10 Feb 1971 accusing the US of violating numerous Geneva Accords, escalating the war, being military adventurers, and spreading imperialist aggression in Laos and Cambodia.

TFR 186-17 to 186-19

Three page document dated 16 Jan 69 from the journal of S. Divil'kovskij, a Soviet Embassy to North Vietnam advisor detailing meetings that he had with Ngyuen Fu Soaem, the representative of the People's Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (PFLSV) during the 30 Dec 68 to 3 Jan 69 period. Nothing related to POW/MIAs.

TFR 186-20 to 186-22

Three page document from the journal of G.V. Cheshev, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in N. Vietnam, dated 31 Jan 69 detailing a meeting that he had on 23 Jan 69 with Vladislav Baduryj. It lists the four-point American-Saigon program that is to be discussed at the conference in Paris, touches on the role the Chinese are playing in supplying the PFLSV with weapons and looks at the Buddhist/Catholic

religious dilemma.

TFR 186-23 to 186-26

Four page document dated 29 Sep 69 that reviews the military operations being conducted by the U.S. backed Vietnamese and Suvanno Fyma forces and the Patriotic Front of Laos who are supported by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It looks at the objectives of the operations, how they were backed, who supported them, and their success or failure.

TFR 186-27 to 186-31

Five page document dated 29 Sep 69 that reviews the situation in Laos in the areas controlled by the leftist group Neo Lao Khak Sat (NLKhS), who are supported by China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, looks at their operational objectives, and successes. It reviews the role of the International Control Commission and the problems it faces in South-East Asia.

TFR 186-32 to 186-33

Two page document dated 2 Feb 71 from the journal of I. S. Shcherbakov, USSR Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), detailing his meeting with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRV Khoang Van Tien. U.S. military operations and objectives in Southern Laos were discussed.

TFR 186-34 to 186-35

Two page document dated 12 Nov 70 from the journal of I. M. Merkulov, Advisor to the USSR Embassy in the DRV, detailing his meeting with Ta Khyu Kan, the Deputy Director of USSR and Eastern European Department. Kan presented an upgrade in postal privileges for arrested American fliers, the attempts by American millionaires to manipulate world opinion against the DRV and asked for Soviet aid to counter it.

TFR 186-36

One page document dated 13 Nov 70 from the journal of M. P. Isaev, Secretary of the South-East Asia Department of the USSR MID, detailing a meeting with the First Secretary of the DRV Embassy in the USSR Ngyuen Van Kuang concerning the new humanitarian measures taken for captured U.S. Fliers.

TFR 186-37 to 186-40

Four page document dated 25 Feb 71 detailing the meeting between the Deputy Director of the South-East Asia Department of the MID USSR V. P. Vdovin and the advisor sent to Moscow by the DRV Embassy Vu Tuan. Tuan reported on the situations in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam concerning South Vietnamese and American forces and their activities as well as the activities of the patriots (N. Vietnam). He requested that the Soviets speak out on his behalf at the Red Cross Conference and support their position on the American POW issue.

TFR 186-41

Message dated 12 Jan 71 from the USSR Ambassador to the DRV for routing a letter.

TFR 186-42 to 186-43

Letter dated 31 Dec 70 to the General Secretary of the TsK KPSS USSR Brezhnev and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin from the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Worker's Party Le Zuan and the Prime Minister of the DRV Fam Van Dong. It thanks the Soviets for their support at the recent Warsaw Pact meeting and the recent statement made by the Soviet Government stating its

support of the Worker's Party and the government of the DRV.

TFR 186-44 to 186-45

Two page document dated 18 May 71 detailing the meeting between the Deputy Director of the South-East Asia Department MID USSR Yu. I. Kuznetsov and DRV Embassy advisor Vu Toan. Toan requests permission for the VIP aircraft, carrying the DRV Deputy Prime Minister and other state officials to the XIV session of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in Prague, to make a stop in Irkutsk to take on a Soviet navigator and food and for a stop over in Moscow on the return flight. He also asks the Soviets to support the DRV position on American POW's at the upcoming Red Cross Conference in Geneva.

TFR 186-46 to 186-49

Document dated 1 Jul 71 from the journal of I. S. Shcherbakov detailing his meeting with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the DRV Ngyuen Ko Tkhat. Reports on Le Dak Tho and Suan Tkhyui's meeting with Kissenger in Paris on 26 Jun 71 and reiterates the N. Vietnamese position for ending the war. Emphatically states that the release of U.S. POW's will start and end on the same days that the withdraw of U.S. and allied forces starts/ends.

TFR 186-50

Note dated 23 Jul 71 requesting that K.V. Rusakov prepare a proposal in reference to TFR 186-52.

TFR 186-51

Note dated 6-7 Jul 71 to V Chebrikov in reference to TFR 186-53.

TFR 186-52

Letter from the Deputy Chairman of the KGB V. Chebrikov dated 2 Jul 71 approving the proposal from M. V. Zakharov to create Aeroflot flights in association with the FRG firm "Ostturist" for flying passengers from Hanoi to Paris via Moscow. He requests that, since this will include the transport of about 5,000 people, the topic of organizing a transfer of American POW's could arise and would like the point of view of the DRV to be clarified.

TFR 186-53

The proposal made by M. Zakharov (mentioned in TFR 186-52) for Aeroflot to develop charter routes from Peking to any destination in Europe. Knoblokh, director of the German tourist firm "Ostturist", arrived in Paris to conclude the contract on 26 Jun 71. The Aeroflot representatives in Paris have come to the conclusion that the topic of discussion is the organization of the transfer of American POW's. They believe that the DRV and USA are in the process of, or have already, agreed to free them.

TFR 186-54

Letter dated 20 Jul 71 from B. Bugaev from the office of the Civil Aviation Ministry USSR to the TsK KPSS stating that the proposed chartered flights are not desirable because the Chinese would in turn make the same request for routes to Europe. He states that the civil aviation is ready to fly the chartered route of Hanoi-Vientiene-Calcutta- Karachi-Tashkent-Moscow-Paris (or another unspecified European city). Permission from third party countries (Burma, Pakistan) would be required along with a contract, no less than 16 days prior to the flight.

TFR 186-55 to 186-56

Letter dated 3 Aug 1971 and signed by the Head of the Department for Administrative agencies TsK KPSS N. Savinkin, Deputy Head of the Department of the TsK KPSS for ties with Communist and

Worker's Parties in Socialist States O. Rakhmanin, and the Deputy Head of the International Department of the TsK KPSS R. Ul'yanovskij to the TsK KPSS (with reference to TFR 186-52, -53, -54) voices concern on project due to ambiguities in the origin and terminal locations, number of passengers and their nationalities etc., and suggest that the proposal not be adopted.

TFR 186-57

List dated 18 Aug 93 of the documents found in TFR 186-52 to 186-55 with archival designators showing document number, document content, search information and number of pages.

TFR 187 SUMMARY

TFR 187-1 to 187-2

Two page enciphered telegram dated 3 Sep 58 addressed to Colonel General Ivashutin, Deputy Chairman of the KGB. Reports on documents recovered from the 2 Sep 58 C-130 shootdown. Itemizes TDY orders, ID cards (Villareal, Sviestra), and foreign banknotes found at the crash site. Signed by General Major Badamyants, KGB Chairman for the Armenian SSR.

TFR 187-3

Supplemental enciphered telegram to TFR 187-1-2 addressed to Ivashutin from Badamyants dated 4 Sep 58 on additional items found at the 2 Sep 58 crash site. Lists a classified document for the operation of radio-technical equipment, an AN/URR-35-SI radio receiver, and a ID card for Paul E. Duncan. Reports finding a total of 7 corpses in the crash debris.

ANNEX H TO JCSB TRIWEEKLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 21 AUGUST-10 SEPTEMBER 1993

SUBJECT: Update on List of 59

1. The initial findings of the analysis of the List of 59 were published in the Task Force Russia Biweekly Report for 9 October 1992. Since then several more entries have have been identified, and this information is included in this update.

2. On 24 September 1992 the Russians provided a list of names of US Korean War POWs (TFR-16) at meeting of the US- Russian Joint Commission on POWs. The list, entitled "List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point," ended with the number 59, but two pages with 15 names were missing. The Russians stated that this list consisted of US personnel interrogated during the Korean War, the reports of which were then provided to the Soviets.

3. The following actions were taken to refine the list:

a. The TFR-16 document was translated by TFR. An identical listing of 59 names passed to Paul Cole, Rand Corporation, was used to complete the TFR-16 list.

b. The List of 59 was then compared to the List of 71 (TFR-2) names, provided earlier to TFR. The List of 71 had been analyzed and most of the names correctly identified with correct spellings by the USAF Missing Persons Branch. Forty-three of the 59 names also appeared among the 71 names. TFR coordination with the Missing Persons Branch was able to identify the correct spelling and identities of most of the remaining names.

c. Rand Corporation's analysis of the 59 names was then compared to the TFR/USAF analysis and revealed the identities of several more names.

d. Using all this information, the attached Corrected List of 59 with the correctly identified and spelled names was created.

4. The analysis revealed that two names had been duplicated and that one name was that of an Australian. Therefore, the List of 59 actually contains 56 names. Of these 56 names,

a Fifty-three are of USAF personnel and three are of USMC personnel who have been positively identified;

b. 51 were returned to military control (RMC) at the end of hostilities in Korea;

e. The remaining five names are unaccounted for servicemembers, referenced by their number on the Corrected

List of 59:

(1) 23. Tenny, Albert Gilbert
CPT, USAF

(2) 24. Reid, Albert J., Jr.
SGT, USAF

(3) 26. Wendling, George Vincent
MAJ, USAF

(4) 48. Harker, Charles Abbot, Jr.
2LT, USAF

(5) 49. Niemann, Robert Frank
2LT, USAF

Correct Name Except where ? (See note on ranks)	Shoot Down Date	Status	List Name is on
1. Stahl, Charles Eugene 2LT (1LT), USAF	7 Jan 52	RMC	71/59
2. Maultsby, Charles Wayne 2LT (1LT), USAF	5 Jan 52	RMC	71/59
3. Green, Joseph F. 2LT (1LT), USAF	11 Jan 52	RMC	59
4. Eyres, Thomas Liewellyn 1LT (CPT), USAF	none given	RMC	71/59
5. Henderson, Jack E. 2LT (1LT), USAF	31 Aug 51	RMC	71/59
6. Wilkens, James V. CPT, USMC	3 Jul 51	RMC	71/59
7. MacClellan, Donald J. LTC, USAF	8 May 51	RMC	71/59

8. Smith, J.B. CPT, USAF	8 May 51	RMC	71/59
9. Wright, Vernon L. 2LT (1LT), USAF	16 Jan 52	RMC	71/59
10. Peterson, Daniel Delong 2nd (1LT), USAF	17 Jan 52	RMC	71/59
11. Enoch, Kenneth Lloyd 1LT, USAF	13 Jan 52	RMC	71/59
12. Quinn, John S. 1LT, USAF	31 Jan 52	RMC	71/59
13. Thrash, William Gay. LTC, USMC	21 Dec 51	RMC	71/59
14. Richardson, Judson Cromwell LTC, USMC	15 Dec 51	RMC	71/59
15. Duplicates No. 19			
16. Kubicek, Harold Bretislav CPT, USAF	4 Jul 52	RMC	71/59

17. Frick, Vance R. 21 Jun 52 RMC 71/59
2LT (1LT), USAF

18. Dearmond, Michael Edward 21 Apr 52 RMC 71/59
1LT, USAF

19. Parks, Roland William 4 Sep 52 RMC 71/59
2LT (1LT), USAF

20. Zwiacher, John Wesley 30 Apr 52 RMC 71/59
1LT, USAF

21. Ellis, John G. 20 Jul 52 RMC 71/59
1LT, USAF

22. Duplicates N. 20.

23. Tenny, Albert Gilbert 3 May 52 MIA 59
CPT, USAF

24. Reid, Elbert J., Jr. 10 Jun 52 MIA 59
Sergeant (SSGT), USAF

25. Kniss, Paul R. 31 May 52 RMC 59
2LT (1LT), USAF

26. Wendling, George Vincent 13Apr 52 MIA 59
MAJ, USAF

27. Arnold, John Knox, Jr. 12 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
Colonel, USAF

28. Thompson, John Walker III 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
Airman 2nd Class, USAF

29. Buck, John W. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
1lT (CPT), USAF

30. Elmer, Fred Allewelin 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
CPT, USAF

31. Vaddi, Eugene T. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
CPT, USAF

32. Schmidt, Daniel C. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
Observer (Airman 2nd Class, USAF)

33. Benjamin, Harry
Martin, Jr. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
Airman 2nd Class, USAF

34. Kiba, Steve E. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
Airman 1st Class, USAF

35. Baumer, William H. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
MAJ, USAF

36. Brown, Howard W. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
TSgt, USAF

37. Brown, Wallace L. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
2LT (1LT), USAF

38. Moreland, Joseph E. 4 Jul 52 RMC 59
1LT, USAF

39. Strieby, Francis Allen 4 Jul 52 RMC 59
2LT (1LT), USAF

40. Brazil, Kenneth S. 4 Jul 52 RMC 71/59
1LT (CPT), USAF

41. Combs, Edward D. 4 Jul 52 RMC 59
Sergeant (SSGT), USAF

42. Koski, William Emile 4 Jul 52 RMC 59
Sergeant (SSGT), USAF

43. Johansen, Charles Vernon 4 Jul 52 RMC 71/59
Senior Sergeant (SSGT), USAF

44. Rivers, Bernard Francis 4 Jul 52 RMC 59
Senior Sergeant (TSgt), USAF

45. Bass, Kenneth H. 4 Jul 52 RMC 59
Sergeant (SSGT), USAF

46. Hand, Donald L. 4 Jul 52 RMC 59
Airman 2nd Class (Airman 1st Class), USAF

47. Fischer, Harold Edward 7 Apr 53 RMC 59
Aviator (CPT), USAF

48. Harker, Charles
Abbot, Jr. 4 May 53 389 List 59
2LT (1LT), USAF

49. Niemann, Robert Frank 12 Apr 53 MIA 59
2LT (1LT), USAF

50. Osburn, John A. 19 Sep 53 RMC 71/59
CPT (MAJ), USAF

51. Heller, Edwin Lewis 23 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
LTC, USAF

52. Izbicky, Edward J. 19 Feb 53 RMC 71/59
2LT, USAF

53. Pape, Donald L. 15 May 53 RMC 71/59
1LT, USAF

54. Giraudo, John C. 16 Jun 53 RMC 71/59
LTC, USAF

55. Bettinger, Stephen L. 20 Jul 53 RMC 71/59
MAJ, USAF

56. Coury, Robert A. 20 Jun 53 RMC 71/59
CPT, USAF

57. Hodges, Albert V. 19 Jun 53 RMC 71/59
1LT, USAF

58. Dillon, Edward 15 Jun 53 RMC 71/59
2LT, USAF

59. Pinkstone, Donald William 15 Jun 53 RMC 71/59
Sergeant, (RAAF-Australian)

Note on ranks: When the Russian list and U.S. records gave different ranks for the same individual, both are included with the Russian listed rank first and the U.S. rank in parenthesis. The difference may be explained by the U.S. practice to promote individuals by schedule even if the soldier is missing in action. This practice explains that almost all the second lieutenants on the Russian list are first lieutenants in the U.S. records maintained by the USAF Casualty Office.

Note on abbreviations. RMC means Returned to Military Control, e.g., those POWs who were repatriated at the end of hostilities. MIA means Missing in Action. All personnel designated MIA were later declared dead by the U.S. Government.

ANNEX I TO JCSB TRIWEEKLY REPORT

FOR THE PERIOD 21 AUGUST -- 10 SEPTEMBER 1993

SUBJECT: Update on the List of 71

1. The initial findings of the analysis of the List of 71 were published in the Task Force Russia Biweekly Report for 9 October 1992. Since then several more entries have been identified, and this information is included in this update.

1. In May 1992 the Russians provided a list of 71 names (TFR-16, 24-34). The list is entitled "List of U.S. Air Force Crew Members Participating in Combat Operations in North Korea in 1950-53, and about Whom Information Has Been Found in Documents of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps."

2. The following actions were taken to refine the list:

a. The TFR-3 document was translated by OSIA;

b. The translated document was forwarded by DASD (IS-POW/MIA) to the USAF Casualty and Memorial Affairs Office (Missing Persons Branch) where most of the names were correctly identified by Ms. Jeanne Lafontaine. Further coordination by TFR with Ms. Lofantaine led to the identification of more names, including three that were USMC.

c. On 24 September 1992 the Russians provided a list of 59 names which had many of the same names as the List of 71. Rand Corportion's analysis of this second list revealed the identifies of several more names. Forty-three names appeared on both lists. Most of the 43 names were listed in the same order with the same information on both lists.

d. Using all this information, the attached Corrected List of 71 with the correctly identified and spelled names was created.

3. The analysis revealed that one name (No. 18) had been duplicated and that one name was that of an Australian (Pinkstone - No. 46), and another was a Canadian (MacKenzie-No. 36). Therefore the List of 71 actually contains sixty-eight names of U.S. servicemen.

a. One name has not been identified (spellings are uncertain): No. 71 - Harm, identified as a gunner on a bomber.

b. Sixty-Five are USAF personnel and three are USMC personnel. Sixty-one of these personnel were returned alive to military control (RMC) after the end of hostilities as determined by the USAF Casualty Office. The remains of Howard P. Miller, Jr. were returned to Military control as well. The Australian and Canadian were also returned alive.

c. Six identified names were <u>not</u> returned to military control and were later declared dead, most of them after the end of hostilities when a presumptive finding of death was made "when evidence considered sufficient to establish the fact of death was received by the Secretary of the Air Force. They are listed below:

1. No. 32 - Hart, Alvin D., Jr.
Airman 1st, USAF

2. No. 33 - Weese, Henry D.
1LT, USAF

3. No. 34 - Van Voorhis, Paul E.
1LT, USAF

4. No. 56 - McDonough, Charles E.
CPT, USAF

5. No. 66 - Bergman, Louis H.
SGT, USAF

6. No. 67 - Unruh, Halbert Caloway
Aviator, USAF

The Corrected List of 71

Correct Name Except where ? (See note on ranks)	Capture or Death Date	Status	List Name is on
1. Stahl, Charles Eugene 2LT (1LT), USAF	7 Jan 5	RMC	71/59
2. Kubicek, Harold Bretislav	4 Jul 52	RMC	71/59

CPT, USAF

3. Maultsby, Charles Wayne 5 Jan 52 RMC 71/59
2LT (1LT), USAF

4. Eyres, Thomas Liewellyn none given RMC 71/59
1LT (CPT), USAF

5. Henderson, Jack E. 31 Aug 51 RMC 71/59
2LT (1LT), USAF

6. Wilkins, James V. 3 Jul 51 RMC 71/59
MAJ, USMC

7. MacClellan, Donald J. 8 May 51 RMC 71/59
LTC, USAF

8. Smith, J.B. 8 May 51 RMC 71/59
CPT, USAF

9. Wright, Vernon L. 16 Jan 52 RMC 71/59
2LT (1LT), USAF

10. Peterson, Daniel Delong 17 Jan 52 RMC 71/59
2LT (1LT), USAF

11. Enoch, Kenneth Lloyd 13 Jan 52 RMC 71/59
1LT, USAF

12. Quinn, John S. 31 Jan 52 RMC 71/59
1LT, USAF

13. Thrash, William G. 21 Dec 51 RMC 71/59
LTC, USMC

14. Richardson, Judson
Cromwell 15 Dec 51 RMC 71/59
LTC, USMC

15. Parks, Roland William 4 Sep 52 RMC 71/59
2LT (1LT), USAF

16. Frick, Vance R. 21 Jun 52 RMC 71/59
2LT (1LT), USAF

17. Dearmond, Michael Edward 21 Apr 52 RMC 71/59
1LT, USAF

18. Duplicates No. 15

19. Zwiacher, John Wesley 30 Apr 52 RMC 71/59
1LT, USAF

20. Ellis, John G. 1LT, USAF	20 Jul 52	RMC	71/59
21. Arnold, John Knox, Jr. Colonel, USAF	12 Jan 53	RMC	71/59
22. Thompson, John Walker III Airman 2nd Class, USAF	13 Jan 53	RMC	71/59
23. Buck, John W. 1LT (CPT), USAF	13 Jan 53	RMC	71/59
24. Elmer, Fred Allewelin CPT, USAF	13 Jan 53	RMC	71/59
25. Vaddi, Eugene T. CPT, USAF	13 Jan 53	RMC	71/59
26. Schmidt, Daniel C. Observer (Airman 2nd Class), USAF	13 Jan 53	RMC	71/59
27. Benjamin, Harry Martin, Jr.	13 Jan 53	RMC	71/59

Airman 1st Class (Airman 2nd Class), USAF

28. Kiba, Steve E. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
Airman 1st Class

29. Baumer, William H. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
MAJ, USAF

30. Brown, Howard W. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
TSgt, USAF

31. Brown, Wallace L. 13 Jan 53 RMC 71/59
2LT (1LT), USAF

32. Hart, Alvin D., Jr. n.a. MIA 71
Airman 1st Class, USAF

33. Weese, Henry D. n.d. MIA 71
1LT, USAF

34. Van Voorhis, Paul E. n.d. MIA 71
1LT, (CPT) USAF

35. Brazil, Kenneth S. 4 Jul 52 RMC 71/59
1LT (CPT), USAF

36. MacKenzie, Andrew Robert 15 Jun 52 RMC 71

Major, Canadian Air Force

37. Osburn, John A. 19 Sep 53 RMC 71/59

CPT (MAJ), USAF

38. Heller, Edwin Lewis 23 Jan 53 RMC 71/59

LTC, USAF

39. Izbicky, Edward J. 19 Feb 53 RMC 71/59

2LT, USAF

40. Pape, Donald L. 15 May 53 RMC 71/59

1LT, USAF

41. Giraudo, John C. 16 Jun 53 RMC 71/59

LTC, USAF

42. Bettinger, Stephen L. 20 Jul 53 RMC 71/59

MAJ, USAF

43. Coury, Robert A. 20 Jun 53 RMC 71/59

CPT, USAF

44. Hodges, Albert V. 19 Jun 53 RMC 71/59

1LT, USAF

45. Dillon, Edward 15 Jun 53 RMC 71/59
LT (2LT), USAF

46. Pinkstone, Donald
William 15 Jun 53 RMC 71/59
SGT, (RAAF-Australian)

47. Fornes, William L. 6 Aug 52 RMC 71
LT (1LT), USAF

48. Schwable, Frank Hawse 8 Jul 52 RMC 71
LTC, USMC

49. Johanson, Charles Vernon 4 Jul 52 RMC 71/59
SGT (SSGT), USAF

50. Bartholomew, Gabriel P. 18 Oct 52 RMC 71
Chief, Operations Dept,
(MAJ) USAF

51. Johnson, Berger Leonard 10 Jan 53 RMC 71
Senior Sergeant (Master
Sergeant), USAF

52. Abrahmson, Gerald D. 29 Jan 53 RMC 71

Operator (Airman 2nd Class),
USAF

53. Van Slyke, Leland H. 30 Dec 52 RMC 71
Radio operator (Airman
Second Class), USAF

54. Fischer, Harold E. 7 Apr 53 RMC 71
(CPT), USAF

55. Shawe, Hamilton B., Jr. 1 Dec 50 RMC 71
2LT (CPT), USAF

56. McDonough, Charles E. 4 Dec 50 MIA 71
CPT (MAJ), USAF

57. Johnston, Frank S. 10 Nov 50 RMC 71
CPT, USAF

58. Hearn, Joseph S. 12 Apr 51 RMC 71
Navigator (CPT), USAF

59. Oldewage, Daniel Henry 12 Apr 51 RMC 71
Senior Sergeant (TSgt), USAF

60. Metz, Henry X. 12 Apr 51 RMC 71

Senior Sergeant (SSgt), USAF

61. King, Marvin Eugene 4 Dec 51 RMC 71
Airman 1st Class, USAF

62. Knego, George James 4 Dec 51 RMC 71
LT (1LT), USAF

63. Moree, Leonard Levi, Jr. 4 Dec 51 RMC 71
SGT (SSgt), USAF

64. Gant, John Kerr 4 Dec 51 RMC 71
SGT (SSgt), USAF

65. Millward, George E. 4 Dec 51 RMC 71
SGT (SSgt), USAF

66. Bergmann, Louis H. 4 Dec 51 MIA 71
SGT (SSgt), USAF

67. Unruh, Halbert Caloway 4 Dec 51 MIA 71
Aviator (CPT), USAF

68. Dean, Zach Wesley 22 Apr 51 RMC 71
CPT, USAF

69. Aubrey, Carl L. MAJ, USAF	12 Aug 51	RMC	71
70. Miller, Howard P., Jr. 1LT, USAF	22 Jan 51 (remains)	RMC	71
71. ? Harm SGT, ?	? Sep 52	?	71

Note on ranks: When the Russian list and U.S. records give different ranks for the same individual, both are included with the Russian listed rank first and the U.S. rank in parenthesis. The difference may be explained by the U.S. practice to promote individuals by schedule even if the soldier is missing in action. This practice explains that almost all the second lieutenants on the Russian list are first lieutenants in the U.S. records maintained by the USAF Casualty Office.

Note on abbreviations: RMC means returned to Military Control, e.g., those POWs who were repatriated at the end of hostilities. MIA means Missing in Action. All personnel designated MIA were later declared dead by the U.S. Government.